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Preface 
The 86 project within the Special Collaborative Program on "Status Passages and 
Risks in the Life Course" examines the time-related interplay between macro-
institutional changes (e.g. industrialization, changes in occupational structure, 
educational expansion, expansion of the welfare state), temporal organization of 
individual life courses (e.g. age-grading, timing of job shifts and educational 
attainment) and the formation, continuation and dissolution of households and families. 
The relationship between macro-Ievel structural change and micro-Ievel individual 
rational action is therefore at the heart of the project's theoretical interest. 
In the first part of this paper, Blossfeld discusses some of the historical reasons why 
the explosion of rational choice scholarship in the social sciences has had surprisingly 
little influence on macro-sociological data analysis. In the second part, he shows that 
any theoretically powerful sociological analysis of a macro-sociological problem must 
pay attention to both structural- and micro-Ievel issues but not in the usual static way. 
Any macro-micro framework must recognize that time is significant in this relationship. 
It must identify the particular historical structures and processes that dominate the 
changes occurring in a given population, and it must specify the causal mechanisms 
that allow us to trace the encounters of intentionally acting individuals with the flow of 
history as aseries of choice processes. Applying the project's research to consensual 
unions, he demonstrates his general theoretical arguments by giving concrete 
examples. 
Prof. Dr. Ansgar Weymann 
Chair, Special Collaborative Programme No. 186 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early 1980s, there has been an explosion of articles and books about the 
need for rational choice approaches in sociology.1 As a consequence of this, rational 
choice theories2 have rapidly grown in complexity and sophistication. Although these 
approaches primarily aim to improve our understanding of real world phenomena, it 
is surprising how little impact they have had on empirical social research in general 
(see, e.g. Green and Shapiro 1994) and on large-scale data analysis in particular 
(Goldthorpe in this volume). 
In this paper, I first want to discuss some of the reasons for this development in the 
field of qüantitative maciosociological analysis. tv1y thesis is that the ambitioüs 
endeavor of rational choice proponents to establish a "newll3 theoretical paradigm in 
sociology has led to the creation of camps and fairly artificial antagonisms between 
a rational choice perspective and all the other types sociological approaches. 
Since rational choice theory is fairly established in sociology today, the time may be 
ripe for more relaxed considerations which could help to overcome an unproductive 
dualism between macro-Ievel and micro-Ievel approaches in the field of large-scale 
data analysis.4 The objective of this paper is to achieve some progress in this respect. 
I contend that only few successful empirical studies of a macrosociological problem 
can concentrate on structural or micro approaches alone. Instead, a theoretically 
powerful sociological analysis must pay attention to both structural- and micro-Ievel 
1 To mention only some of many important publications: Coleman (1986, 1990), 
Coleman and Fararo (1992), Elster (1979, 1986, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c), Esser 
(1990, 1991, 1993), Esser and Troitzsch (1991), Friedman and Hechter (1988), 
Gambetta (1987), Heath (1976), Hechter (1983, 1987), Hedsträm and Swedberg 
(1995), Kiser and Hechter (1991), Lindenberg (1982, 1985, 1989, 1990), Opp 
(1986), Raub and Voss (1981), Voss (1985), Wippler and Lindenberg (1987). 
2 I use the term rational choice theory loosely to include rational action theory (e.g. 
Abell 1992), utilitarian or economic conceptions of man (e.g. Lindenberg 1985), as 
weil as strategie or game-theoretic modes of thinking (e.g. Elster 1979). 
3 Actually, the lines of thought can be traced back to classical authors in economics 
and sociology. 
4 For the need to link macro- and micro-perspectives, see Stinchcombe (1968), 
S0rensen (1977), Hechter (1983), Tilly (1984), Granovetter (1985), Coleman (1986), 
Friedman and Hechter (1988), Esser (1991), Oppenheimer (1994), Blau (1994), 
Hedsträm (forthcoming), Hedsträm and Swedberg (in this volume), or Goldthorpe 
(in this volume). 
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issues. However, this macro-micro framework5 must recognize from the outset that 
time matters in this relationship. It must achieve two goals: (1) it must identify the 
particular historical structures and processes which dominate the changes occurring 
in a given population, Le., the sociologically important dependent and independent 
variables;6 and (2) it has to specify the causal mechanisms that allow us to trace the 
encounters of intentionally acting individuals with the flow of history as aseries of 
choice processes. 
The invaluable function of time in this respect is to offer a continuously changing point 
of reference by distinguishing, conceptionally and empirically, between a closed (but 
always changing) past, the respective presentness, and an intrinsically open future. 
Good sociological theories should not oniy aiiow us to explain (or ünderstand) a given 
outcome at present with reference to the closed past, but also help us to predict 
outcomes in an uncertain future with reference to the known past and present 
conditions. In my view, the crucial empirical test of sociological theories is not the 
extent to which they help us to explain a given outcome ex post facto, but the degree 
to which they also yield successful predictions of individuals' actions and their 
outcomes ex ante? 
Over the last 15 years, modern longitudinal social research has made great progress 
in assessing causal inferences based on sociological theories more adequately.8 Life 
course and panel studies have collected time-related data over substantial blocks of 
space and historical time. In methodological terms, the most important but still fairly 
unrecognized advancement that has been made is that longitudinal data can be 
studied by new statistical methods in a stepwise time-related fashion. They allow us 
to follow up a great number of individuals belonging to different cohorts over longer 
spans of time and to differentiate at each point in time between a closed past, the 
presentness, and an intrinsically open future (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). My 
intention in this paper is to demonstrate how causal relations suggested by a dynamic 
combination of macro and micro theories can be represented in event history models 
and tested with temporal data. 
5 As I will discuss below, I agree with Blau (1994) that Coleman's (1990) micro-macro 
transition needs to be reversed into a macro-micro transition. 
6 Rather than assume abstractly specified processes such as differentiation, 
individualization, or concentration (see Tilly 1984). 
7 With regard to theory, Elster (i 989a) distinguishes determinacy and adequacy. A 
theory is indeterminate when and to the extent that it fails to yield unique 
predictions. It is inadequate when its predictions fail. 
8 In these studies the point of reference that distinguishes a posteriori and a priori is 
not the survey date anymore, but may be any point in time within an observation 
window covered by a longitudinal study (810ssfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
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2. Why Has Rational Choice Theory Not Seen Very Successful in Large-Scale Data 
Analysis? 
Let me first consider the reasons for the obvious fact that the influence of rational 
choice theory on quantitative macrosociology has been surprisingly small (see also 
Goldthorpe in this volume). My thesis is that in the process of establishing rational 
choice theory as a "newll theoretical paradigm in sociology, its proponents have tended 
to pigeonhole their rivals, to caricature competing theories, to exaggerate existing 
theoretical cleavages, to overlook their own conceptional weaknesses, to downplay the 
difficulties of their empirical applications, and to neglect more recent and actually quite 
successful theoretically driven research programs based on longitudinal data.9 
Of course, there is not only one single rational choice theory but perhaps as many 
different versions as there are protagonists. 10 There has also been an important shift 
from earlier crude models with fairly unrealistic behavioral assumptions towards more 
recent theories elaborating the role of heterogeneous preferences, the effects of 
uncertainty, the impact of structural constraints, the relationship between norms and 
rational choice, and the possibilities of the non-existence of a rational choice. No 
doubt, this development has made rational choice approaches increasingly attractive 
for empirical practitioners. However, the result of the aspiration to establish rational 
choice theory as the only coherent and unified theoretical approach in sociology has 
been the creation of a scientific camp mentality which unfortunately almost completely 
disregards rational choice approach es in large-scale data analysis. Using a concrete 
example of my recent research on consensual unions, I want to demonstrate this in 
more detail here. 
Attacking Outdated and Empirically Unimportant Theories 
Rational choice theorists have frequently been polemical against specific sociological 
conceptions which rarely had but certainly almost completely lost their influence on 
empirical studies today. For example, proponents of rational choice theory enjoy 
criticizing the homo sociologicus 11, extreme normative sociological conceptions 12, 
9 The most important examples are life course, cohort and panel research. 
10 After reviewing the rational choice literature for this paper, I was increasingly 
confused by the great number of obviously contradicting propositions, theoretical 
statements and hypotheses discussed in this field. The only common denominator 
seems to be a commitment to purposive individualism: an epistemological position 
that social phenomena can only be exp!ained in terms of intentional actions of 
individuals. Sut even this position is not shared by all rational choice theorists. 
Some of them do not use individuals as the unit of analysis but treat states or firms 
as corporate actors (see the discussion in Friedman and Hechter 1988). 
11 For example, the critique of Lindenberg (1985, 1990) or Esser (1987, 1989, 1990, 
1991) with regard to the conception of a socially determined homo sociologicus is 
7 
crude functionalism, or more elaborated models of structural-functionalism 13. But as 
far as I can see, all of these theories, though still discussed in theoretical sociological 
seminars, have turned out to be fairly irrelevant in contemporary empirical research. 14 
Thus, even if the theoretical critique of rational choice proponents is justified, it could 
not be very consequential for the conduct of concrete empirical social research today. 
I want to demonstrate this point with a concrete example from my recent research 
where my colleagues and I analysed the question of why people living in consensual 
unions marry if there is a pregnancy (Blossfeld, Klijzing, Pohl and Rohwer 1995). In 
an extreme version of the normative model, one would have to assert the dominance 
of normative constraints and simply deny the importance of a choice at all. Thus, with 
the occurrence of a pregnancy in a consensuai union, norms would have the effect of 
cutting down the feasible set of actions to a single point, Le. marriage. Today's cohabi-
tating men and women would therefore be portrayed as mindlessly repeating or 
imitating what the ancestors did in the past in similar situations (see Elster 1989b). But 
as a serious theory of marriage action this model is obviously too wrong to merit any 
empirical analysis. Hence, it is not surprising that, to the best of my knowledge, there 
is no empirical researcher who has shaped his/her analysis of this problem on the 
basis of such a strong normative conception. 
Rejecting an extreme normative approach in empirical studies however does not mean 
that norms (and culture) do not matter. Rather it is my view that norms are extremely 
important. Social interactions are intrinsically symbolic relationships that have a mean-
ing and can therefore not be understood without reference to cultural settings. 15 Vet 
in their fierce attempt to push for a duality between an intentionally acting person 
justified, but I actually do not know any contemporary empirical researcher who 
would work with this strong version of the homo sociologicus in his/her empirical 
study. 
12 For example, Elster (1989b) rightly declines the extreme version of the normative 
model because people would then simply stick to prescribed behavior even if new 
and apparently better options become available. But I do not see that such a 
caricature of man as a pure passive executor of inherited norms would be the 
theoretical basis of any empirical analysis today. 
13 For example, Coleman (1986, 1990), Elster (1979) or Hechter (1987) convincingly 
reject functional and structural-functional explanations because these theories have 
no place for individuals, and purpose (or any regulative idea) must be rejected at 
the system level. But which serious empirical researcher of social phenomena 
would still employ such theories of the 1960s and eariy i 970s? 
14 Of course, this observation reflects the huge gap between theory and empirical 
research in today's sociology. 
15 For example, Ferejohn (1991) suggested that rational choice approaches have to 
be complemented by cultural theories to be more successful. 
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guided by instrumental rationality and a passive executor of social norms (or culture), 
rational choice theorists often lose sight of the fact that norms (culture) and rational 
choices are important in empirical applications. 16 The important theoretical issue for 
empirical analyses is therefore not whether social norms (culture) or instrumental 
rationality provide the motivation for actions 17, but how they can be conceptionally 
integrated so that we are better able to understand real life situations. 1S 
For example, in the research application mentioned above, values, social norms, and 
traditions certainly have an important impact upon people's marriage behavior in the 
case of a pregnancy, but in most cases this influence is likely to be mediated through 
the intentional actions of individuals. It is therefore plausible that there is achanging, 
frequeney-dependent19 coexistence of norm~guided behavior and rational, self-
centered behavior with regard to the decision to marry when a pregnancy occurs in 
a consensual union (cf. Elster 1989b). In such a hybrid model of empirical application, 
social norms do not dictate the marriage behavior, but allow a deliberate, reflective 
imitation of traditions. This is because social norms normally offer a considerable 
seope of interpretation and manipulation. Social norms' main function might be to 
focus and coordinate expectations (Elster 1989b). Thus, when the norm "If the woman 
gets pregnant, then marry" is still shared within a community, people will to a certain 
degree expect each other to do that. In particular Elster (1989b) has stressed that the 
coordinating function of norms is mainly due to the strong emotions that their violations 
can trigger in the violator himself and also in other people. Thus, the social norm "If 
the woman gets pregnant, then marry" is likely to be sustained by the feelings of 
embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame that a person suffers at the prospect of 
violating it. Of course, such emotions may or may not help unmarried couples to reach 
a marriage decision when the woman is pregnant, and they certainly will rarely be the 
only motivation for such an important and long-term decision. But this conerete 
research example illustrates that our understanding of the relationship between norms 
and intentional action is only in its rudimentary beginnings and that rational choice 
theory simply must provide better analytical concepts in this regard, if it is to serve as 
a powerful instrument in empirical applications. 
Aspirations to Universal ("Time-Less") Theories 
Many (but fortunately not all) rational choice theorists adopt a rigid version of the 
modern philosophy of science (Green and Shapiro 1994). They strive for general 
16 See, for example, Opp (1986) who comes to a similar conclusion in his empirical 
application. 
17 "NornlS do not üsefülly contrast with self-interest." (Lukes 1991: 148). 
18 See, for example, the interesting papers by Lindenberg (1983), Heiner (1983), and 
Lukes (1991). 
19 The probability that people will follow a social norm at time t' is very likely to be 
dependent on the degree of conformity in a social context at time t (t < t'). 
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causal theories and universallaws (e.g. Lindenberg 1985; Esser 1993) and think little 
about "historicistic analyses" and "inductive generalizations" (e.g. Kiser and Hechter 
1991). Regardless of how one values the merits of historicism and induction in 
sociology2°, by no (Iogical) means are sociologists forced to accept only a choice 
between statements about universal laws or statements about accidental, contingent 
historical relationships. Rather, sociologists can legitimately try to establish causal 
mechanisms of limited generality tailored to a specific range of historical situations 
(e.g. Gambetta 1987; Elster 1989c; Hedström and Swedberg 1995 and in this volume). 
I will develop this perspective in more detail in the next section. 
Yet the strong aspiration to develop general theories and universal laws of social 
action may be one of the reasons why many sociologists consider rational chaice 
theory to be empirically unappealing. In particular, the mainstream version of this 
approach lJexplains" people's rational actions with regard to universal and stable 
general human preferences and considers constraints as exogeneously given (Stigler 
and Becker 1977; Becker 1981; Lindenberg 1985, 1990). However, if preferences are 
universal and stable among individuals (Stigler and Becker 1977; Becker 1981; 
Lindenberg 1985, 1990), they must turn out to be simply irrelevant for explaining differ-
ences in peoples' behavior (Gambetta 1987).21 In this model, individuals' particular 
"tastesll or their marginal utilities, for specific courses of actions can therefore only be 
derived from the constraints (or opportunities) in concrete social situations. Thus, 
economically rational individuals may be portrayed as passive agents, with no more 
outstanding intentions than to adjust optimally to changing constraints.22 However, 
without specifying the concrete constraints and their changes in time and space, the 
theoretical model is necessarily empty (Kelle and Lüdemann 1995). The trick is to 
distill into an explanation the important constellation of factors in a situation and their 
relations. The question is not whether to abstract from the complexity of the social 
reality (see e.g. Lindenberg 1985) but whether the appropriate abstraction has been 
done. Thus, lJif an abstract theory has explanatory power, this is not merely because 
it is abstract, but because the abstraction in question captures the essen ce of what 
is going on causally" (Green and Shapiro 1994:191). 
20 As noted by Oppenheimer (1994), good sociological research is normally 
characterized by constantly going back and forth between theoretical and empirical 
analyses (between deduction and induction). 
21 For example, Lindenberg (1985, 1986, 1990) further developed Becker's theory to 
what he calls a IJsocial production function approach 11, assuming that there are at 
least two ultimate human goals: "physical well-being" and "social approval. lJ As a 
third candidate, he aiso mentioned "Iüss-avoidance." HovJever, \I\Jhether ane accepts 
Lindenberg's assumptions about these ultimate goals of man or not is actually not 
important because they do not explain differences in individuals' actions. 
22 Ironically, against the critique of rational choice theorists that the homo sociologicus 
is conceptionalized only as a puppet of structure, one could reply that the homo 
economicus is only a puppet of structural change. 
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This leads us to the next question: What are the important constraints and possible 
alternative courses of actions?23 Because these issues are exogenous to rational 
choice theory, this model must be silent in answering this question. Thus, rational 
choice theory logically presupposes macrotheory to identify the specific historical struc-
tures and processes which produce and change concrete opportunity sets for 
individuals' actions and, one should add, cut down the set of abstractly possible 
courses of action to a vastly sm aller subset of feasible actions (Elster 1979) - making 
choices possible at all24 (see Blau 1994). Blau is therefore right that Coleman's 
micro-macro transition needs to be reversed into a macro-micro transition to represent 
the correct causal nexus (Blau 1994:150).25 To avoid ad hoc formulated "bridge 
assumptions" (Lindenberg 1990)26 about concrete action situations, rational choice 
+h"'''' ... y .... "'''',../ ... "' .... "'" .... 1;1"\;+ n"\"I"\t"",+hl"\l"\t"\I 27 LI ICUI I ICCU-=> QI I CAtJlI\.,,1l 1I I Q\." I VlI IOVI y. 
Let me demonstrate this point again using the above application example. The 
economic theory of the family (see Becker 1981) postulates that the general preferenc-
e to marry is basically the same for all actors at all times and places, so that differenc-
es in observed marriage behavior after the occurrence of a pregnancy can only be 
explained by differences in the set of opportunities. But what are the concrete 
opportunities in this specific action situation? Using Becker's economic theory of the 
family, we simply don't know! This universal theory only states that the decision 
whether to marry at all when a pregnancy occurs is related to expectations of what will 
happen within marriage in the future: (1) what the expected gains are (i.e. the 
dependencies of partners' utilities on each other28) and (2) how they are going to be 
23 In Lindenberg's (1985) terminology: What are the initial conditions? 
24 There is no choice without alternatives. In the rational choice theory, constraints are 
assumed to be not within the control of the agents. However, human actors always 
have the choice to change these alternatives. This causes Gambetta (1987) to 
argue that rational choice theory is more likely to ask which course of action an 
individual is likely to choose among those open to hirn, rather than how and when 
individuals will take action for changing the available alternatives. 
25 Of course, this controversy between Blau and Coleman only reflects a very static 
view of the world. As I will develop below, both perspectives are important 
sim ultaneously. 
26 In the case of empirical social research, it would be better to use the term "bridge 
hypotheses" instead of "bridge assumptions." 
27 This is because these assumptions cannot be deduced from the general rational 
I"\hl"\;l"\'" n"\1"\"'/1"\1 \"'1 IVI\"'O' IIIVUO'I. 
28 In the economic theory of the family, altruism is particularly considered to be an 
important element in the functioning of families. It ties couples together even if only 
one of the partners is altruistic. They then all care about their joint income, and all 
try to maximize it, even the selfish family members. The mechanism that 
guarantees this is the compensatory behavior of transfers from altruists to others. 
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distributed (e.g. to which degree positive assortative mating is associated with 
complementariti9), and (3) what division of labor they rest on (e.g. the extent of sex-
specifie specialization in the household and market sector). Because real actors are 
normally not asked to give answers to these questions, it is easy to see that without 
additional (ad hoc) hypotheses about the various concrete gains of marriage, their 
aetuallv possible distribution among the partners and the history-specific types of 
division of labor between the sexes, this lIexplanationll is necessarily empty in any 
empirieal analysis. Thus, concrete history-specific hypotheses about the constellation 
of constraints (opportunities) are needed in any empirical application. Because rational 
choice theory does not generate them, the researcher is dependent on his/her 
ingenuity. Of course, this opens the door for ad hoc considerations. 
In our concrete research example, the researcher therefore would have to IIspeculatell 
about the reasons for marriage today. For instance, he/she could contend that 
marriage provides the opportunity for long-run intimacy and emotional support, a 
companionship that, by involving historical continuity, promises memories of a shared 
past (Oppenheimer 1988). It also provides the opportunity for regular (and safer) sex, 
and so on. Most of these returns to marriage not only defy easy quantification, but, 
more important for our current example, these gains could also be obtained within 
long-term consensual unions.30 Why is it then that many of these couples want 
marriage as a setting for having children? In economic terms, one could argue that in 
(West) Germany the tax system rewards non-work or part-time work of one parent and 
since not enough kindergartens, pre-primary schools and daycare institutions are 
provided in (West) Germany, one of the parents (the wife in particular) tends to 
interrupt her/his employment when the child is born, and to a large extent, only re-
enters the labor market again after some lengthy period, if at al1. 31 Thus, the conerete 
(economic) returns to marriage for such couples would be tax reduction and more 
security for the parent (the wife in particular) that leaves the labor market for some 
period. Another reason for men could be that in (West) Germany custody for the child 
Thus, as long as the altruists receive something, selfish family members behave 
altruistieally both toward altruists and toward the altruists' other beneficiaries. This 
type of behavior makes it possible to define a fam ily utility function based on the 
altruists' preferences, which everybody wants to maximize. 
29 This means to which degree there is a beneficial effect of one trait on the marginal 
contribution of the other. 
30 It is important to note here that most of the gains of marriage assumed by the 
economie theory of the famiiy can aiso be realized in consensual unions of modern 
societies. In this sense, the economic theory of the family circumscribes a very 
traditional family system. 
31 Theoretically, husband or wife could interrupt their employment, but empirically it 
is still an exception that husbands stay at home (see Blossfeld, Drobnic and 
Rohwer 1995). 
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is only granted to the married father. However, if the partners get along very weil with 
each other this could be of minor importance. 
In summary, this example demonstrates three interesting points: (1) All of these 
reasons are somehow plausible motivations to get married; (2) they are not specifically 
suggested by rational choice theory; and (3), at least in my view, they are unlikely to 
be the reason for such an important and long-term life course decision as marriage.32 
Thus, rational choice protagonists' endeavor for universal theories comes at a high 
price: theorizing does not arise out of concrete empirical problems anymore and the 
suggested more specific hypotheses often become more or less arbitrary. However, 
it is exactly these specific hypotheses that are of particular interest in any empirical 
stüdy. They help the researcher to understand the situation or to predict individuals' 
concrete actions, and they are the IIvariablesll that typically have to be assessed 
through empirical research. 
Criticizing Empirieist Studies 
When rational choice proponents survey large-scale data studies, they normally focus 
on a very specific type of empirical research that is predominantly non-theoretical, 
methods-driven or simply empiricistic. For example, Esser (in this volume) attacks 
quantitative social research from the perspective that it only tries to lIexplain" the 
variance of adependent variable by a set of independent variables. 33 True, there are 
many practitioners of quantitative sociology who are uncritically happy when 
associations are found, and the stronger the better. 34 However, there are just as 
many competent empirical social scientists who know that this narrow view is wrong 
and unproductive (see Goldthorpe and Ultee in this volume). They are aware of the 
fact that variance explained or high levels of goodness-of-fit statistics do not explain 
anything, only theory does.35 However, in their attacks against non-theoretical and 
merely methods-driven kinds of empirical research, many rational choice protagonists 
tend to throw out the baby with the bathwater and disregard the great number of 
32 For example, in Sweden, a country with a tax system that does not reward dual full-
time marriages and offers better child-care provisions, it is still very common for 
cohabiting couples to marry in the advent of a first birth (see Hoem 1995:46). 
33 See also Coleman (1986) and Freedman (1991). 
34 See the excellent book by Lieberson (1985). 
35 !ronically, the introduction of newer approaches to data analysis - log-linear models, 
logit models, hazard rate models - decreased the danger that applicants will be 
mechanical with respect to lIexplained variancell because maximum likelihood 
estimation does not provide such a nice measure like R2 . Pseudo-R2 measures are 
much less attractive because they depend on the number of observations and 
successive comparisons with likelihood ratio tests can only be relative (and in most 
cases hierarchieal). 
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excellent and theoretically informed quantitative work, particularly in the newly 
developing field of longitudinal data analysis. 
Caricaturing Social Stratification and Mobility Researchers to be Studying Variables 
Instead of Actors 
Many proponents of rational choice theory have blamed social stratification and 
mobility researchers to be "variable sociologists"36 (e.g. Esser in this volume) 
studying the relationships between variables instead of actors (e.g. Elster 1979; 
Coleman 1986; Boudon 1981; Abbott 1992). Technically speaking this is indeed true. 
Using the individual as the unit of analysis,37 stiatification researchers ask peop!e 
about their characteristics, things they do, or things that have happened to them. 
These measurements are stored as variables and the relationship among them is then 
analyzed using statistical techniques. However, to contend that structural researchers 
conceptionally treat "variables rather than individuals as the units of analysisll (Boudon 
1981; Esser in this volume) or even "variables as subjects that are doing the action" 
(e.g. Abbbtt 1992) is more than a caricature of a competing sociological approach. It 
also exaggerates (smalI) existing theoretical cleavages between structural approaches 
and the mainstream version of rational choice theory. 
True, structural researchers theoretically focus on the constraints of individual actions 
rather than on individuals' intentions. They are particularly interested in situations 
where the actions of a great number of individuals are channeled by external con-
straints leaving not much room for the importance of individual choice. For example, 
mobility processes between social classes (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992), 
educational opportunities of working class children (e.g. Shavit and Blossfeld 1993), 
mobility constraints for workers in various labor market segments (e.g., Blossfeld and 
Mayer 1988), wage differentials between men and women (e.g. Hannan, Schömann 
and Blossfeld 1990), gender-specific career opportunities (e.g. Blossfeld and Hakim 
forthcoming), structural constraints in the process of family formation (e.g. Blossfeld 
1995) etc. In most such empirical applications structural sociologists do not deny 
choice. Rather they contend that structural constraints affect individual actions by 
determining the objective probabilities that their most preferred aim (e.g. better 
educational attainment, higher income, career advancement, better life etc.) can be 
realized. Thus, structural constraints make some desired aims easy for individuals to 
attain; they make other goals more difficult to attain and, in extreme cases, they 
preclude the attainment of specific ends altogether (Friedman and Hechter 1988). For 
example, the role of consensual unions was quite different in the former Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Oemocratic Republic (GOR) (see 
Blossfeld/Klijzing/Pohl/Rohwer 1995) because of different structural constraints. In the 
36 In German the term is "Variablensoziologen" (see Esser in this volume). 
37 We neglect inequality studies based only on aggregated data because they are 
rarely used today. Most social structural and mobility studies are based on 
individual data. 
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GOR after the late 1970s there was a structural reason not to marry in the event of 
a child because these unmarried mothers had privileged access to daycare institutions, 
had Ion ger paid maternity leaves, and had a better opportunity to stay at horne and 
take care of sick children (Huinink 1994). Therefore, in the GOR more than 500/0 of 
first births took place out of wedlock in the late 1980s, whereas in the FRG, the 
respective figure was still below 10% at the end of the 1980s (Pohl et al. 1992). In 
addition, mothers who were enrolled in school received better daycare service for their 
children and privileged access to student's hornes etc. And this explains why there is 
no significant effect of educational attainment and school enrollment on entry into 
marriage and motherhood for East Germany. In the GOR, a pregnancy was no danger 
for the school career, as has been the case for West Germany. 
It is also true that in structural studies the assumptions about actors are often left 
implicit (Gambetta 1987). However, because structural sociologists normally accept, 
implicitly or explicitly, the rationality assumption ("people act reasonablell ) as weil as 
the presumption that individuals strive for similar ends (e.g. better educational 
attainment, higher income, career advancement, better life etc.), they simply consider 
the intervening action orientation of individuals as fairly uninteresting compared to the 
impact of structural constraints. Thus, one could contend that their explanations only 
seem to be "incomplete" (e.g., as contended by Esser in this volume) because it would 
make little difference for our understanding of individuals' actions, if a structural 
explanation of possible courses of action were explicitly added to a highly sophisti-
cated choice model or not. 
To some extent, this discussion also shows that the distinction between an econo-
mist's (e.g. Stigler and Becker 1977)38 explanation39 on the one hand and the 
explanation of a structural sociologist on the other becomes obscure. In both 
approaches changing constraints are extremely important. However, in my view, the 
approach of the structural sociologist is theoretically superior because it does not 
consider the changes in the constraints as theoretically external or assumed to be 
given. Rather it tries to identify and conceptualize the relevant structural alternatives 
in an evolving social world. 
Problems of Predicting Courses of Action 
As summarized by Elster (1989a), rational choice theory conceives the actor as a 
decision-maker who successfully achieves three optimizing operations: Jlfinding the 
best action, for given beliefs and desires; form ing the best-grounded belief, for given 
evidence; and collecting the right amount of evidence, for given desires and prior 
beliefs" (Elster 1989a:4). 
38 But also adopted by sociologists (see e.g. Lindenberg 1985). 
39 Assuming that only opportunity costs differ, so that "new tastes ll could be derived 
from the change of specific constraints, given general human preferences. 
15 
Early rational choice models have not been very attractive for practitioners of empirical 
research because they suppressed most real-world complexities of the decision 
situation by unrealistic behavioral assumptions (see Goldthorpe and Ultee in this 
volume). In order to derive "elegantll models, scientists assumed that preferences and 
constraints are given and that the actors are fully informed about all possible courses 
of actions, and about their eonsequences as weil as the likelihood of events. It can be 
shown that all sorts of behavior are consistent with or plausibly suggested by these 
types of ehoice models. However, not surprisingly, they have not been very successful 
in predicting peoples' behavior empirically. 
Predictions of empirical courses of action might fail in such rational choice models 
because of two reasons: (i) peopie may aet irrational and/or (2) the real-vvor!d 
situations in which people try to behave rationally are much more complex than 
assumed in the theoretical model. 
Let me first discuss the case where people behave irrationally. In this case, individuals 
do not carry out the action that is best for their given beliefs and desires; they do not 
form the best-grounded beliefs for given evidence or do not collect the right amount 
of evidence for given desires and prior beliefs. Although irrationality is quite wide-
spread, I will not discuss it any further here. The reason is that we are not interested 
in determining the actions of particular individuals but in explaining the general 
regularities which govern the actions of many people (see Goldthorpe in this volume). 
At this aggregated level however the rationality assumption plays a privileged role --
not only because most people normally want to be rational, but also because the 
prediction of the behavior of aggregates will most likely be successful if we assume 
that, by and large, people act rationally (Elster 1989a).40 As Stinehcome (1968) has 
shown, the behavior of large aggregates can also be comprehended reasonably weil, 
even when the individual eomponents of the aggregates are poorly understood. Given 
this macro-Ievel focus, small idiosyncratic deviations of individuals from the postulated 
rational model are not damaging for sociological predictions (Hedström fortheom-
ing).41 Aggregate intentions are also apt to be mueh more stable than individual 
intentions over time (Ajzen 1985). See, for example, the studies about the number of 
children women planned to have (Bumpass and Westoff 1969;; Westoff and Ryder 
1977). They showed that at the individual level only 41 % of the women had exactly 
the number of children they had planned. On the average, however, the women's 
actual family size (3.3 children) was found to correspond precisely to the intended 
family size (also 3.3 ehildren) (Bumpass and Westoff 1969). 
40 And even if we conelude that irrationality offers the best explanation of a given kind 
of group behavior, then most of the evidence about the agents that goes into that 
conclusion is formed on the assumption that they are, by and large, rational (E!ster 
1989a). 
41 Thus, rational ehoice explanations need not be derivable from postulates about 
psychological states of individuals. However, they m ust be compatible with 
optimizing assumptions about the intentions of individuals (Green and Shapiro 
1994). 
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For empirical applications in sociology, it is more interesting to discuss prediction 
failures of rational choice theory because real-life situations are much less determinate 
than assumed in the restrictive theoretical models. Following Elster (1989a), such 
uncertainties can arise at three levels. 
First, the actions of individuals may not be easily predictable because individuals are 
unable to compare and rank all possible courses of action. This problem is particularly 
severe when individuals know little about the alternatives themselves to make a 
rational decision. For example, it is hard for people to compare and rank rationally 
different future educational tracks, alternative job careers, differences in long-term 
marriages with various partners etc. because they simply do not know much about 
these alternatives in future. Thus, when decisions have to be made to prefer one 
future mode of life to another, more peripheral considerations often come to the fore 
to motivate adecision (Elster 1989a). In this sense, one could argue in our particular 
research example that couples living in consensual unions do know little about their 
concrete marital lives in future (Burkart 1994) so that they have to motivate their 
marriage decisions by more "peripheral reasonsll like tax reduction and more security 
for the wife that leaves the labor market for some period. But there is not only the 
question of whether to marry. Equally important is an answer to the question of when 
the right time for marriage iso If future possible alternatives (with other marriage 
partners) are not yet known, there is also the problem of when to make the optimal 
decision with regard to these (still unknown) alternatives. There is always an incentive 
to postpone a marriage decision because other possible marriage partners might be 
more attractive, but postponing marriage forever clearly might not be optimal for an 
individual who would like to marry. On the other hand, there is also the danger that 
the current possible marriage partnre opts for another partner making it attractive to 
marry earlier. Thus, in many situations people have to introduce a mechanism that 
triggers off adecision at a specific point in time. For example, couples ready for 
marriage could decide not to use contraceptives anymore and simply wait to see what 
happens. The "chance eventll of a pregnancy could then be used as a motivation to 
determine the concrete timing of entry into marriage. 
Second, the behavior of actors may be hard to predict, as there could be uncertainties 
with regard to their beliefs. This means that individuals are not able to reliably assign 
probabilities of possible results of their future courses of action. With respect to the 
previously mentioned research example, men and women living in consensual unions 
will have problems in predicting the future gains of marriage, how they will be 
distributed amongst them and what division of labor they will rest on. Under such 
uncertainties, rational choice theory is quite limited. As noted by Elster (1989a), this 
problem is particularly severe when adecision requires beliefs about choices to be 
made by other people in future, as is the case in our research example where each 
prospective marriage partner must have long-term beliefs about the future choices to 
be made by the respective other one. 
Finally, problems arise with regard to the optimal amount of information one should 
collect before forming an opinion. Collecting information is necessary, but costly and 
time- consuming. Unfortunately, it is often not possible to estimate probable marginal 
costs and benefits for further information searches. Therefore, actors sometimes set 
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certain tolerance limits for themselves which, when satisfied, stop the search for 
additional information (Simon 1954, Esser 1991). Thus, in our example, cohabitation 
could be interpreted as a temporary trial period before marriage (Manting 1994). The 
problem of each partner is to then decide how long he/she should further collect 
information about the respective other person in daily life situations until a reasonable 
marriage decision can be made.42 Also in this case, the event of a pregnaney can 
help the couples to stop further information searches about each other and push them 
to make up their m inds. 
In summary, in many empirieal applications of large-scale data analysis rational ehoice 
theory can be attacked as a quite powerless theory when one wants to derive 
unambiguous predictions because of the absence of ~vell-defined sets of alternatives 
and their consequences, information processing limitations in computing optima from 
known preference and utility information or unreliable probability informations. Thus, 
in my view, the usefulness of rational choice theory for typical empirical applications 
in macro sociology is crucially dependent on the extent to which this approach is able 
to incorporate various forms of unresolved value conflicts and the consequences of 
uncertainty. 
Heiner (1983), for example, argues that the limits to maximizing actually become the 
origin of predictable behavior. He suggests that the observed regularities of actions 
should be understood as IIbehavioral rulesll that arise because of uncertainty in distin-
guishing preferred from less-preferred behavior. Uncertainty requires actions to be 
governed by mechanisms that restrict the flexibility to choose potential courses of 
actions, or which produee a selective alertness to information that might prompt 
particular courses of actions to be chosen. These mechanisms will simplify behavior 
to less-complex patterns, which are easier to recognize and to predict (by the actors 
themselves and, of course, by the social scientist!). According to Heiner (1983), 
predictable behavior will evolve to the extent that uncertainty prevents agents from 
successfully maximizing. Greater uncertainty will cause behavioral rules to be more 
restrictive in eliminating particular actions or response patterns to potential information. 
Heiner (1983) interprets social institutions or social norms as such rule-mechanisms 
for dealing with recurrent situations faced by individuals (see also Lindenberg 1983; 
Esser 1991; Lukes 1991 ).43 They enable each actor (and the social researcher!) in 
modern societies to know less and less about the behavior of the other individuals and 
about the complex interdependence generated by their interaction. 
42 Interestingly, many empirical studies on the role of eohabitation in the divorce 
process show that peopie who have cohabited before marriage have much lower 
marital stability than couples who did not cohabit before marriage (Hoem and Hoem 
1988; Bumpass and Sweet 1989; Schoen 1992; Klijzing 1992; Manting 1994). This 
suggests a self-selection process, in which couples with a high dissolution rate 
seleet themselves into consensual unions before marriage. 
43 See also the work on "habits" and "framing" (e.g. Lindenberg 1990; Esser 1990). 
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Another way to reduce choice complexity under uncertainty is that individuals attempt 
to constrain or bind the flexibility of their own future actions (Elster 1979). This line of 
argument offers a more general explanation for the marriage decision in our research 
example. It could be developed round the idea that having children is an irreversible, 
long-term, joint proiect that constrains the behavior of both partners (and that of the 
woman in particular). On the one hand, a child decreases the chances of finding a 
new potential partner for both women and for men. There is a greater need for stability 
for both partners because later possible matches may not be as desirable as the 
current one. This risk is probably greater for women, given their tendency to be 
responsible for children (Oppenheimer 1988; Blossfeld, Manting, and Rohwer 1993). 
In addition, if quality of children (Becker 1981) is an important desire of individuals, 
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difficulty of making this joint long-term project a successful one, however, lies in 
forecasting the own future behavior and the future behavior of the cohabiting partner 
on the basis of the incomplete information currently available. This suggests that the 
decision to marry depends partlyon how weil the individuals can predict their own and 
their partner's future lives. One rational way of making oneself act in favor of the joint 
long-term project in future is to induce a belief from which that course of action will 
follow compellingly (Elster 1979). From this point of view, marriage could be seen as 
a precommitment to bind oneself at present in order to increase the probability that 
one will carry out a certain (honorable or responsible) behavior with regard to the child 
and the partner in the future. As noted by Elster (1979), the crucial point here is that 
the expected change in the probability of the later course of action is the motive for 
marriage -- not an unintended effect, nor a predictable and not unwelcome effect. 
Marriage as a means of precommitment is also a natural technique for lending credibil-
ity to promises for the partner (Elster 1979). Thus, it might be individually rational to 
follow the norm "If the woman gets pregnant, then marryll because it lends credibility 
to promises that otherwise would be less believable. Hence, an important condition for 
predictable behavior is making credible communications about what one will do under 
future circumstances.44 These credible promises enable the partners to cooperate 
more than they would have otherwise done. There can be three reasons why 
unmarried partners are expected to behave more honorably when they are married 
under unforseen circumstances in the future: (1) Marriage instead of cohabitation is 
not considered to be a trial period;45 (2) marriage compared to cohabitation has a 
44 It goes without saying that the partners are free to bind themselves through a 
marriage contract to protect their "deeper" values against their more impulsive ones 
(see Elster). 
45 There is plenty of empirical evidence that the period of cohabitation in modern 
societies is still dominated by a "weeding process" (Klijzing 1992). 
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much higher level of stability,46 and (3) the dissolution of a marital contract involves 
much higher transaction costs than the dissolution of a consensual union.47 
Neglecting the Dynamics of Historical Processes 
Although the framework of rational choice theory is inherently dynamic (Lindenberg 
1985),48 most of its proponents have not really taken the time-relatedness of social 
processes seriously. Rather they prefer logical reconstructions of IItime-less" action 
situations (see, e.g. Esser 1991). This is because much rational ehoice scholarship is 
(very often implicitly) an equilibrium analysis under static conditions (Green and 
Shapiro 1994; Ultee in this voiume).49 it is simply assümed that sueh ehoice situa-
tions can be arbitrarily abstracted from a continuous social proeess, involving two 
unproblematic sets of factors: preferences and (perceived) action opportunities 
(Hedström forthcoming).50 The problem of this lIahistorical approach" is the implicit 
assumption that subsections of the social process have clear beginnings, middles, and 
ends.51 But this does not hold for entities such as societies. For them, as noted by 
Abbott (1992), there is only an endless middle. Societies consist of a continuous 
stream of historical events and sets of situational consequenees flowing from those 
events. Thus, when we conduct an empirical study, the historical process is always 
ongoing and this poses difficult theoretical and empirical speeification problems with 
46 All studies show that marriages have a much higher level of stability (8.g. Klijzing 
1992; Hoem 1995). 
47 Based on this analysis, one could offer a speculative argument about the ehanging 
significance of marriage as a credible promise: If cohabitation loses its meaning as 
a trial period, changes its character with increasing stability, or if the costs of 
divorce are reduced, then this will tend to erode the chances of making a credible 
promise by the act of marriage and lead to fewer marriages in the case of pregnan-
eies in consensual unions. 
48 For example, Beeker's (1975, 1981) theory of human capital and his economic 
theory of the family, or more dynamic game theoretical considerations with several 
iterations. 
49 Sometimes also a comparative-static analysis is used, where it is assumed that the 
direction on which an equilibrium is expected to move in response to exogenous 
changes in ends, beliefs, or environmental constraints is known. 
50 It is not by chance that many rational choice theorists assurne preferences and 
constraints simply as given. In this conception only the future counts and the past 
does not seem to be important. 
51 In rational choice theory, this assumption also applies to subsections of the 
individual life course. 
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regard to the preferences and constraints at any point in time.52 Of course, as 
discussed above, many rational choice scholars simply assume preferences and con-
straints as unproblematically given, and they unrealistically pretend that social 
processes are in equilibria or, at least, always move swiftly towards them after an 
external upheaval is introduced (see Ultee in this volume).53 However, after more 
than 20 years of empirical life course and cohort research, these assumptions seem 
to me more than peculiar and outdated. 
Thus, when we study the dynamics of action situations both empirically and 
theoretically, we should instead start with the idea that we artificially open an 
observation window with regard to an already continuously flowing stream of social 
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this should be recognized and also reflected in analytical terms.54 There is always 
a previous history before any history. Therefore, two questions become important: (1) 
How can we conceptualize and measure the genesis of individuals' preferences and 
the secial constraints to which people are exposed up to the point in time when we 
begin to study an action situation? and (2) How do preferences and constraints 
develop over time within an (empirical or conceived) observation window? 
The first question is of crucial importance because most sociological research must 
be based on non-experimental observations of social processes, and these processes 
are highly selective and historically specific (Lieberson 1985). One of the important 
contributions of life course studies has been to make macrosociology more sensitive 
towards these issues. This research focuses on peoples' life courses because at least 
these entities have a clear beginning, middle and end in the flow of history.55 In 
particular, these studies demonstrated in many empirical analyses that the following 
considerations are important for our understanding of the social process (e.g., 
Blossfeld 1989, 1995; Mayer and Tuma 1990; Huinink 1993): (1) Life courses are 
highly time-related, selective, and cumulative processes that are molded by history-
specific institutions and culture as weil as by purposive individuals; (2) life courses 
always emerge and change under particular historical conditions that have to be 
carefully considered (period effect); (3) in modern societies, successive generations 
52 In event history analysis this methodological problem is called "left censoring ll 
(Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
53 The equilibrium assumptions in economics and sociology have often taken attention 
away from a serious interest in processes of change in the social system (Tuma 
and Hannan 1984). 
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particular have theorized about the question of how social order is possible at all. 
Most of them seem to believe that it would be possible and meaningful to develop 
an analytical model that restarts the social process from scratch. 
55 Making the theoretical and empirical specification of constraints and preferences 
less vulnerable. 
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start and experience their life courses in very different historical settings and therefore 
differ markedly (cohort effect); (4) individuals are affected by various parallel processes 
at different levels (Le., there are multiple Glocks and point-in-time events at the micro, 
intermediate and macro level); (5) not only the type of event (e.g. pregnancy) but also 
its timing is of importance for the courses of action (e.g. marriage); and (6) time-
dependencies in specific states can be interpreted as expressions of dynamic causal 
processes or diffusion processes56. 
The second question of how preferences and constraints develop within an 
observation window is equally important because the processes just mentioned do not 
come to a halt at the beginning of an observation window. Individuals' actions must 
therefore be studied from the perspeciive Ulat they interact v"ith these processes over 
time. Thus, the interdependencies of individuals' social actions and structural 
processes at different levels have to be reconstructed. 
Let's demonstrate this aspect again based on our example where the woman gets 
pregnant in a consensual union. With regard to the marriage decision, it seems to be 
important to distinguish two completely different situations at the time of the discovery 
of the pregnancy: (1) the preferences of the partners to marry are vague and diffuse; 
and (2) the couple already has had reached adecision to marry or not to marry in the 
case of child. 
Diffuse marriage preferences and the negotiation process: For many couples in 
modern societies, the preferences towards marriage might be quite vague and diffuse 
at the beginning of the pregnancy, so that through the occurrence of a pregnancy a 
process of preference formation and persuasion might be initiated (Elster 1989c). 
Formation means that initially relatively vague preferences with regard to marriage are 
formed, resulting in more clear-cut preferences in a step-wise negotiation process. 
Persuasion means that an individual is led by a sequence of short-term improvements 
into preferring marriage over non-marriage, even if he/she initially vaguely preferred 
non-marriage over marriage.57 In such cases, the discovery of a pregnancy 
engenders a process of change in preferences. This process of preference formation 
and persuasion will be very time-structured due to two reasons. On the one hand, the 
opportunity to legalize the birth of the child tends to decrease with the duration of 
pregnancy. At the same time the likelihood of possible medical complications 
(premature birth, be laid up with health problems, etc.) connected with the pregnancy 
and the visibility of pregnancy to other people increases. Hence, the optimal time for 
marriage, in the sense of the smallest risk of medical complications connected with the 
pregnancy and the visibility of the pregnancy to other people, is at a relatively early 
pregnancy phase. On the other hand, the optimum in the sense of a safe, well-thought 
through decision based on a negotiation process between the partners is often at a 
56 Based on the idea that some sort of "contagion", lIinfection", "imitation", IIconformi-
ti', "bandwagon", IInorm effects", or simply social pressure drives the process under 
study (see Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995; Manski 1995). 
57 Or the other way around. 
22 
relatively later phase of the pregnancy.58 Thus, there is a constant tension between 
these often opposing forces in the attempt to optimize the marriage timing, a tension 
that may often but not necessarily be connected with a considerable shift in 
preferences with regard to marriage. Based on these contradictory forces on the 
marriage decision process, one would expect that the rate of entry into marriage after 
the discovery of pregnancy at first increases with the duration of pregnancy and then, 
after reaching some maximum, decreases again as the time of birth comes closer. 01 
course, shortly before and after the birth, one would expect a very low marriage rate. 
Finally, after the birth has already taken place out of wedlock, the decision of whether 
or not to marry has a different quality. The child is then already 1Ii1legitimatell , and the 
time pressure to marry has disappeared.59 Thus, one has to again expect a relative 
lew maiiiage rate some time after the birth of the child. The results of the empirica! 
analysis of Blossfeld, Klijzing, Pohl and Rohwer (1995) show that after having con-
trolled for several important covariates, West German women do indeed seem to 
follow this pattern with respect to the rate of entry into marriage. This interpretation 01 
the time-dependence within the observation window is derived from a theoretically 
supposed underlying negotiation process model at the level 01 the non-marital couples, 
leading to a formation and perhaps a change in initially still unstructured preferences 
for marriage.60 
Marriage decisions and the observed rate 01 entry into marriage: Of course, one could 
also argue that many couples had already decided to marry or not to marry when the 
pregnancy was first discovered. Thus, couples would in fact be extremely heteroge-
neous with regard to their baseline rate to enter into marriage when the pregnancy is 
observed. For example, if the consensual union population consists of two groups -
one with a constantly low marriage rate61 and the other with an increasing rate as 
pregnancy progresses62 - this neglected (or unobserved) heterogeneity will then 
58 It is very likely that after some time, there is a cut-off point where calculation stops 
and the partners simply have to make a still unsupported choice. This point might 
just as weil be as elose to the childbirth as possible. 
59 One could argue that the next important date that exerts pressure to reconsider the 
marriage decision is new pregnancy or the time of entry into school. 
60 The time-dependent dummy variables in the study of Blossfeld, Klijzing, Pohl and 
Rohwer (1995) therefore served as proxies for a theoretically important process that 
is hard (or even impossible) to measure. 
61 Only in extreme cases would one expect a marriage rate of zero. 
62 For couples who have already reached adecision to marry in the event of 
pregnancy there is the additional pressure to really go through with it due to the 
increasing risks of medical complications connected with the pregnancy (e.g. 
premature births) and the visibility of the pregnancy to other people. This will, of 
course, lead to an increasing marriage rate with the progression of pregnancy. 
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result in a bell-shaped marriage rate in the observation window, too (Blossfeld and 
Rohwer 1995). This is because at the progression of pregnancy, the composition63 
of the unmarried couples shifts towards couples being IIless ready for marriage" or 
being "not ready for marriagell which, at first, increases and then decreases the 
observed rate pattern.64 
To be able to examine these theoretical interpretations, one would need in addition to 
the usual available lIobjectivell data about facts and events (Le. the dates of entry into 
pregnancy and marriage), time-related information about partners' beliefs with regard 
to their possible future marriages and their expected outcomes, the information these 
actors actually take into account in making decisions, and the results of these 
decisions themselves (see, e.g. Liefbroer and Oe Jong-Gierveld 1993) 65. Thus, for 
studies aiming to model individuals' choices and behavior over time, panel observa-
tions of beliefs, expectations and available information states, combined with retro-
spective information on behavioral events since the last sweep, appear to be a very 
desirable design (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
3. A Dynamic Integration of Micro- and Macro-Perspectives 
In this section, I want to develop a more systematic sketch of how causal relations 
suggested by a dynamic combination of macro and micro theories can be represented 
in event history models and then be better examined with temporal data. 
Max Weber's Pioneering Work 
The epistemological justification for a combination of micro- and macro-Ievel 
approaches rests on Max Weber's ideas that complete sociological explanations have 
63 See also DeGraf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath (1995). for a similar discussion with 
respect to voting behavior. 
64 Thus, if we do not know whether the couples have already reached adecision to 
marry in the case of a child at the time of pregnancy, we are not able to say 
whether the effects of the dummy variables must be considered as proxies for the 
formation of couples' decisions during pregnancy or for the heterogeneity of 
couples' marriage decisions at the beginning of pregnancy. Obviously, both interpre-
tations may be valid in reality. However, the important conclusion is that the 
discovery of a pregnancy leads to achanging marriage rate for most couples within 
the observation window. 
65 It is very important to also record the timing of decisions. For example, it could 
happen that a couple first decides to marry; then, following this decision, the woman 
becomes pregnant, and finally the couple marries. In this case, we would observe 
pregnancy occurring before marriage and assume that pregnancy increases the 
likelihood of marriage. However, the time order between the events is exactly the 
other way around: the couple decides to marry and then the woman gets pregnant. 
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to combine two different methods66: Erklären (the establishment of statistical 
associations between observable events67) and Verstehen (the theoretical specifica-
tion of relationships between observable events, typical actors' intentions and their 
purposive actions). Consequently, successful sociological explanations must rely on 
both, on empirical correlations between events and causal mechanisms helping us to 
understand why people in specific situations act in a typical way producing a statistical 
relationship (Elster 1989c; Stinchcombe 1991; Kiser and Hechter 1991; Hedsträm and 
Swedberg 1995 and in this volume). 
Sociological explanations can therefore fail in two respects: (1) If we are not in a 
position to say something about the frequency (or probability) of a specific type of 
situation and its outcomes, then we cannot assess the socio!ogica! relevance or 
explanatory power of a supposed causal mechanism, regardless of how weil we 
theoretically understand a particular situation;68 and (2) if we are not able to specify 
a theoretical mechanism, then we cannot understand the sociological meaning of an 
observed covariation between variables, independently of how strong this association 
may be.69 Of course, to avoid pure storytelling (Hedström forthcomingfO, a causal 
66 "Kausale Erklärung bedeutet also die Feststellung: daß nach einer irgendwie 
abschätzbaren, im - seltenen - Idealfall: zahlenmäßig angebbare, Wahrscheinlich-
keitsregel auf einen bestimmten beobachteten (inneren oder äußeren) Vorgang ein 
bestimmter anderer Vorgang folgt. .. Eine richtige kausale Deutung eines konkreten 
Handeins bedeutet: daß der äußere Ablauf und das Motiv zutreffend und zugleich 
in ihrem Zusammenhang sinnhaft verständlich erkannt sind. Eine richtige kausale 
Deutung typischen Handeins ... bedeutet: daß der als typisch behauptete Hergang 
sowohl (in irgendeinem Grade) sinnadäquat erscheint wie (in irgendeinem Grade) 
als kausal adäquat festgestellt werden kann. Fehlt die Sinnadäquanz, dann liegt 
selbst bei größter und zahlenmäßig in ihrer Wahrscheinlichkeit präzis angebbarer 
Regelmäßigkeit des Ablaufs ... nur eine unverstehbare ... statistische 
Wahrscheinlichkeit vor. Andererseits bedeutet für die Tragweite soziologischer 
Erkenntnisse selbst die evidenteste Sinnadäquanz nur in dem Maß eine richtige 
kausale Aussage, als der Beweis für das Bestehen einer (irgendwie angebbaren) 
Chance erbracht wird, daß das Handeln den sinnadäquat erscheinenden Verlauf 
tatsächlich mit angebbarer Häufigkeit oder Annäherung (durchschnittlich oder im 
'reinen' Fall) zu nehmen pflegt. 11 (Weber 1972:5-6). 
67 Of course, this association should not be spurious. 
68 Rational choice theorists often start their explanations at the individual level, and 
they do not pay any attention as to whether these situations actually recur in 
approximately the same form. Thus, they may understand the situation but simply 
fail to establish the sociological importance of their models. 
69 Very often sociologists using cross-sectional data and sophisticated methods of 
data analysis (Iike regression equations, path analyses, and structural equation 
models), only seek to "explain" the variation in the dependent variable (e.g. the 
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mechanism cannot be an ad hoc-interpretation or simply an ideographie account; and, 
as discussed above, to evade substantive emptiness, it can also not be a universal, 
"time-Iess" law (Elster 1989c)?1 Rather sociological mechanisms should be consid-
ered as elementary theoretical building blocks of limited generality tailored for a 
specific range of historical situations.72 Thus, the term causal is not used here in the 
traditional meaning with regard to universal, "time-Iess" laws. It is based on systematic 
temporal variations and patterned regularities that themselves are a legitimate focus 
of our sociological understanding. This important difference will be made clearer 
below. The function of macro-Ievel theories is to assist us in identifying the relevant 
structural events (or variables);73 the task of micro-Ievel theories is to help us to 
explain why there is a relationship between them.74 
proportion of variance explained). Thus, these sociologists establish the generality 
of a pattern but are unable to understand the relationship. 
70 I believe that all sociological explanations somehow have a character of storytelling. 
71 Several proponents of rational choice theory emphasize the importance of 
nomological laws in sociology (e.g. the works of Esser and Lindenberg). For 
example, they postulate that actors perceive courses of action and choose the 
action that maximizes (optimizes) their expected utility. However, as discussed 
above, for an empirical analysis of a concrete action situation this theory is empty 
because it is silent with regard to the concrete courses of perceived actions, their 
various utilities and the subjective probabilities attached to them (Kelle and 
Lüdemann 1995). 
72 The advancement of sociology could then be seen in a growing body of IIknowledge 
of ever-more mechanisms rather than ever-better theoriesll (Elster 1989c). 
73 For example, macro theories may point our attention to specific processes like 
educational expansion, changes in the occupational, job or class structure, 
restructuring processes in the labor market, changing rates of unemployment, 
modernization processes, trends in the household structure or the dynamics of 
family types. 
74 For example, the rational actor model may be used to represent the principles 
guiding the actors' behavior in responding to macro trends and changes (Hedström 
forthcoming). It may help us to understand how a specific combination of individual 
desires, beljefs, and changes in action opportunities generate a specific action 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1995 and in this volume). 
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The Dynamics of Observed and Unobserved Processes 
In my view, many of the fruitless debates and misunderstandings with regard to the 
relationship of macro- and micro-levef5 issues are due to the fact that sociologists 
often use "time-Iess" analytical terms and construct "time-Iess" theoretical models. But 
only if we take the time dimension more seriously, is it possible to recognize that in 
the dynamic interplay of structural events and individuals' choices, there is always an 
"earlier" and "Iater" that has to be defined in terms of past, present, and future (Prior 
1967). "Time-Iess" theoretical thinking76 neglecting the timing in the relationships 
necessarily will produce aporias, paradoxical problems, and belief controversies 
among scientists. For example, the debate of what is more important for a sociologist, 
institutiona! embeddedness or individual action (e.g. Lindenberg 1995; Coleman 1990; 
Blau 1994), is obviously an unnecessary question, as is the one about whether 
individuals' preference change engenders change in the social structure, or whether 
structural change leads to changing preferences. There can be no doubt that both 
aspects are important: institutional embeddedness and individual action, individual 
preferences and social structure - but there is always a time order of events in this 
relationship. For example, the claim that explaining behavior by reference to different 
preferences would be tautological (see Friedman and Hechter 1988) is, of course, only 
true in a time-Iess conception where preferences are equated with behavior. 77 
However, when the dynamics of preferences and behavior respectively are measured 
over time, then this is not the case anymore. Actually, it seems to me that this is the 
only fruitful approach to empirically test propositions derived from rational choice 
models. Thus, we have to strive for reliable and valid time-related measures of the 
unobserved entities like tastes, beliefs, decision rules etc. (see Green and Shapiro 
1994).78 In particular, we must collect data on rational expectations predictions of 
individuals' future behavior.79 
75 Blau (1994) correctly stresses that simplistic conceptions of only two levels may be 
highly misleading. Complex social structures normally consist of multiple levels of 
structure. 
76 Normally nurtured by the inferentiallimitations of cross-sectional data analysis (see 
Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
77 It is interesting that rational choice proponents and economists in particular (see 
Manski 1995) often question the validity of measures other than behavior - actual 
choices - as indicators of preferences, tastes and beliefs (see Green and Shapiro 
1994). 
78 Of course, this is a Pandora's box that cannot be adequately discussed in this 
paper (see, e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Ajzen and Madden 1986; Ajzen 1989; 
Henerson, Morris and Fitz-Gibbon 1988; Manski 1995). 
79 These are respondents' best predictions of their behavior including information 
about (1) the awareness of the respondents about the actual process determining 
their future behavior and (2) the knowledge they possess at the the respective point 
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The Dynamics of Parallel Processes at Different Levels. 
To make progress in the understanding of the dynamics of social action, we have to 
develop a sociological perspective that stresses such changes (or events) and their 
historical context. Actors should be conceptualized as individuals who intentionally 
decide between discrete courses of action, and these decisions and their possibly later 
following actions can occur at any point in time. If the dependent variable is discrete, 
like the outcomes of choices, and can change its state at any time, then a transition 
rate framework offers a time-point-related representation for causal effects (Blossfeld 
and Rohwer 1995). 
A continuous time path of discrete intentional actions (or events) of an individual in 
one domain of life might be called a process. This process is normally embedded in 
a complex system of other parallel processes. These can operate at different levels. 
For example: 
1. there can be parallel processes at the level of the individual in different domains 
of life (e.g. one may ask how upward and downward moves in an individual's job 
career influence his/her intentional actions in the family), cf. e.g. Blossfeld and 
Huinink (1991), and Blossfeld (1995); 
2. there may be parallel processes at the level of some few individuals interacting 
with each other (e.g. one might study the effect of the careers of the husband on 
his wife's purposive participation in the labor force), see for instance, Bernasco 
(1994), Blossfeld, Drobnic and Rohwer (1995); 
3. there may be parallel processes at the intermediate level (e.g. one can analyze 
how changing household structure determines women's intentional participation 
in the work force), see as an example, Blossfeld and Hakim (forthcoming); 
4. there may be parallel processes at the macro level (e.g. one may be interested 
in the effect of changes in the business cycle on individuals choices with regard 
to family formation), see Blossfeld and Huinink (1991); 
5. there may be any combination of processes type (1) to (4). For example, in the 
study of life-course, cohort and period effects, time-dependent covariates at 
different levels must be included simultaneously (Blossfeld 1986; Mayer and 
Huinink 1990). Such an analysis combines processes at the individual level 
(life-course change) with two kinds of processes at the macro level: (1) variations 
in structural conditions across successive (birth, marriage, etc.) cohorts, and (2) 
changes in particular historical conditions affecting all cohorts in the same way. 
In event history analysis, time-dependent covariates have been used to include the 
sampie path of parallel processes in transition rate models. In the literature however 
in time (Manski 1995). 
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only two types of time-dependent covariates have been described as not being subject 
to reverse causation (see e.g. Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; Tuma and Hannan 1984; 
Blossfeld, Hamerle, and Mayer 1989; Vamaguchi 1991; Courgeau and Lelievre 1992): 
1. Defined time-dependent covariates whose total time path (or functional from of 
change over time) is determined in advance in the same way for all subjects under 
study. For example, process time like age or duration in astate (e.g. duration of 
marriage in divorce studies), is a defined time-dependent covariate because its values 
are predetermined for all the subjects. Thus, by definition, the values of these 
time-dependent covariates cannot be affected by the dependent process under study. 
2. Ancillary time-dependent covariates \AJhose time path is the output of ::J sto~h::J~ti~ 
process that is external to the units under study.80 Again, by definition, the values of 
these time-dependent covariates cannot be influenced by the individual actor 
themselves. Examples of time-dependent covariates that are approximately external 
in the analysis of individuallife courses are variables that reflect changes at the macro 
level of society (unemployment rates, occupational structure, etc.) or the population 
level (composition of the population in terms of age, sex, race, etc.), provided that the 
contribution of each actor is small and does not really affect the structure in the 
population (Vamaguchi 1991 ).81 
In contrast to defined or ancillary time-dependent covariates, internal time-dependent 
covariates have been referred to as being problematic for causal analysis of social 
processes (e.g. Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; Tuma and Hannan 1984; Blossfeld, 
Hamerle, and Mayer 1989; Yamaguchi 1991; Courgeau and Lelievre 1992). An internal 
time-dependent covariate VtB describes a stochastic process, considered in a causal 
model as being the cause, that is in turn affected by another stochastic process V/, 
considered in the causal model as being the effect. Thus, there are direct effects in 
which the processes autonomously affect each other (VtB affects V/ and VtA affects 
VtB) , and there are "feedback" effects, in which these processes are affected by 
themselves via the respective other process (VtB affects VtB via V/ and V/ affects vt 
via VtB). In other words, such processes are interdependent and form what has been 
called a dynamic system (Tuma and Hannan 1984). Interdependence is typical at the 
individual level for processes in different domains of life and at the level of few 
individuals interacting with each other (e.g. strategie or game-theoretic actions in the 
ca se of career trajectories of partners; see, e.g., Elster 1979). For example, the 
empirical literature suggests that the employment trajectory of an individual is 
influenced by his/her marital history and marital history is dependent on the 
employment trajectory. 
80 In Eister's (1979) terminology, this is parametrie rationality or parametrie action. 
81 For example, consider the changes in the occupational structure. While a job move 
by an individual might contribute to the change in the occupational structure, its 
effect on the job structure is negligibly small. 
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Blossfeld and Rohwer (1995) have proposed a causal approach to interdependent 
systems that provides a straightforward solution to (1) the sim ultaneity problem of 
interdependent processes, (2) the identification of lags between causes and their 
effects, (3) the study of temporal shapes of effects, and (4) the dynamic integration of 
macro and micro perspectives. I will outline this approach in more detail in the 
following. 
Causes and Time-Dependent Covariates 
In an influential paper, Holland (1986) developed the idea that causal statements imply 
counterfactual reasoning: 11 the cause had been different, there would have been 
anoiher outcome, at least vvith a certain probability. HO\NeVer, the consequences of 
conditions that could be different from their actual state are obviously not empirically 
observable.82 This means that it is simply impossible to observe the effect that would 
have happened on the same unit of analysis, if it were exposed to another condition 
at the same time. 
Because causal relationships are inherently time-related connections, Blossfeld and 
Rohwer (1995) suggested to look in empirical applications at conditions which actually 
do change in time.83 For example, a time-constant variable IIgenderll should ideally 
be replaced in an empirical analysis by time-changing events assumed to produce 
sex-specific differences in the life history of men and women. Of course, in empirical 
research that is not always possible, so that very often one must rely on time-constant 
"variables" as weil. However, it is important to recognize that for these variables the 
implied longitudinal causal relation is not examined. For example, if we observe an 
association among people with different levels of educational attainment and their job 
opportunities, then we can normally draw the conclusion that changes in job 
opportunities are a result of changes in educational attainment level. The implied idea 
is the following: If we started having people with the lowest educational attainment 
level and followed them over the life course, they would presumably differ in their rates 
to attaining higher levels of educational attainment and this would produce changes 
in job opportunities. Whether this would be the case for each individual is not very 
clear from a study based on people with different levels of educational attainment. In 
particular, one would expect that the causal relationship (or causal mechanism) 
between education and job opportunities would radically be altered if all people 
acquired a higher (or the highest) level of educational attainment. Thus, the two 
statements - the first about associations across different members of a population and 
the second about dependencies in the life course for each individual member of the 
population - are quite different; one type of statement can be empirically true while the 
other can be empirically false. Therefore, statements of the first type cannot be 
regarded as substitutes for statements of the second type. However, since all causal 
propositions have consequences for longitudinal change (see Lieberson 1985), only 
82 Holland (1986) calls this "the fundamental problem of causal inference." 
83 These changes can occur in discrete and continuous types of processes. 
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time-changing variables provide a more convincing empirical evidence of causal 
relations. 
These changes are events. More formally, an event is a change in a qualitative or 
quantitative variable, and this change must happen at a specific point in time. The 
most obvious empirical representation of causes is therefore in terms of variables that 
can change their states over time. In event history analysis, this statement is linked 
very naturally with the concept of time-dependent covariates. The role of a time-de-
pendent covariate in this approach is to indicate that a (qualitative or metric, direct or 
indirect observable) causal factor has changed its state at a specific time and that the 
unit under study is exposed to another causal condition. 
Form this point of view, it seems somewhat misleading to regard processes or states 
of processes as causes. Instead, only events, or changes in astate variable, can 
sensibly be viewed as possible causes. 
Time and Causal Effects 
Consequently, we would not say that a process Yt is a cause of a process y tB, but 
that a change in Yt could be a cause (or provide a new condition) of a change in y tB• 
Or more formally: 
~YtA ~ ~Yt'B t < t' 
meaning that a change in process Yt at time t is a cause of a change in variable Yt'B 
at a later point in time, t'. It is not implied, of course, that ytA is the only cause which 
might affect Yt'B. So we should speak of causal conditions to stress that there might 
be, and normally is, a quite complex set of causes. A change in variable Yt is 
therefore always measured relative to other causes. As noted by Marini and Singer 
(1988), a conjunctive plurality of causes occurs if various factors must be jointly 
present to produce an effect. A disjunctive plurality of causes, on the other hand, 
occurs if the effect is produced by each of several factors alone, and the joint 
occurrence of two or more factors does not alter the effect.84 These considerations 
are important because in my view they provide the main reason for a time-dependence 
of causal mechanisms in sociology. They are always relative to a history-specific 
constellation of other causes. A causal mechanism may change or even disappear in 
the course of history because of changes in the setting of other important causes. 
Thus, if causal mechanisms are studied empirically, they must intrinsically be related 
to historical time. There are several further important aspects. 
84 See the extensive discussion by Marini and Singer (1988). 
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Time Axis and Events 
First, to speak of a change in variables necessarily implies reference to a time axis. 
We need at least two points in time to observe that a variable has changed its value. 
Of course, at least approximately, we can say that a variable has changed its value 
at a specific point in time.85 Therefore, we use symbols to refer to changes in the 
values of the time-dependent variable Ll VtA and the state variable Ll VtB at time t. This 
leads to the important point that causal statements relate changes in two ( or more) 
variables. 
Time Order, Time Intervals. and Apparent Simultaneity 
Second, there is a time ordering between causes and effects. The cause m ust 
precede the effect in time: t < t', in the formal representation given above. This seems 
to be generally accepted.86 As an implication, there must be a temporal interval 
between the change in the variable representing a cause, and the change in the 
variable representing a corresponding effecl. Thus, the role of time in causal explana-
tions does not only lie in specifying a temporal order in which the effect follows the 
cause in time. It additionally implies that a temporal interval is necessary for the cause 
to have an impact (Kelly and McGrath 1988). It takes some finite amount of time for 
the cause to produce the effecl. The time interval may be very short or very !Qng, but 
can never be zero or infinity (Kelly and McGrath 1988). In other words, there can 
never be a simultaneity of cause and its effect. 
Some effects take place almost instantaneously. For example, if the effect occurs at 
microsecond intervals, then the process must be observed in these small time units 
to uncover causal relations. However, some effects may occur in a time interval too 
small to be measured by any given methods, so that cause and effect seem to occur 
at the same point in time. Apparent simultaneity is often the case in those social 
science applications where basic observation intervals are relatively crude (e.g. days, 
months, or even years), such as, for example, yearly data about first marriage and first 
childbirth (Blossfeld, Manting, and Rohwer 1993). Other effects need a long time until 
they start to occur. Thus, there is a delay or lag between cause and effect that must 
be specified in an appropriate causal analysis. Unfortunately, in most of the current 
85 Statements like this implicitly refer to some specification of IIpoint in time. 1I The 
meaning normally depends on the kind of events which are to be described, for in-
stance, a marriage, the birth of a child, or becoming unemployed. In event history 
text books, a continuous time axis for purposes of mathematical modeling is 
nonnally assümed (see Blossfeld and Roh'vver 1995). This should hO\A/eVer be 
understood as an idealized way of representing social time. Here we are using 
mathematical concepts to speak about social reality, so we will disregard the 
dispute about whether time is "continuousll (in the mathematical sense of this word), 
or not (see also Abbott 1992). 
86 See, for instance, the discussion in Eells (1991, Ch.,5). 
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rational choice theories and interpretations of research findings this interval is left 
unspecified. 
Temporal Shapes of the Unfolding Effect 
This immediately leads to a third point. There might be different shapes of how the 
causal effect Vt unfolds over time. While the problem of time-Iags is somehow 
recognized in the literature on methods in sociology, almost no attention has been 
given to the temporal shapes of effects (Kelly and McGrath 1988). Sociologists often 
seem to be quite ignorant about the fact that causal effects could be highly 
tinle-dependent, too. They normally assüme that there is an almost all-at-once change 
in the dependent variable that is then maintained. However, the effect may be very 
time-dependent too. For example, (1) it may gradually increase; (2) at first rise, reach 
a maximum and then decrease; or (3) show a cyclical pattern over time (see Blossfeld 
and Rohwer 1995). Thus, an appropriate understanding of causal relations between 
variables should take into account that the causal relationship itself may change over 
time. This seems particularly important in sociological applications of causal reasoning. 
In these applications we generally cannot rely on the assumption of eternal, time-Iess 
laws but have to recognize that the causal mechanisms may change during the 
development of social processes. In fact, analyses of these changes of mechanisms 
is usually what is of particular interest in sociology. 
The Principle of Conditional Independence 
Combining these ideas, a causal view on parallel and interdependent processes 
becomes easy, at least in principle. Given two parallel processes, vt and VtB, a 
change in vt at any (specific) point in time f may depend on the history of both 
processes up to, but not including f. Or stated in another way: what happens with VtA 
at any point in time f is conditionally independent of what happens with VtB at f, 
conditional on the history of the joint process Vt = (VtA,VtB) up to, but not including f. 
Of course, the same reasoning can be applied if one focuses on V/ instead of VtB as 
the lIdependent variable. 1I Blossfeld and Rohwer (1995) call this the principle of 
conditional independence for parallel and interdependent processes.87 
The same idea can be developed more formally in the event history framework. 
Beginning with a transition rate model for the joint process, Vt = (vt,vtB), and 
assuming the principle of conditional independence, the likelihood for this model can 
be factorized into a product of the likelihoods for two separate models: a transition rate 
model for VtA which is dependent on VtB as a time-dependent covariate, and a 
87 The terminology is adapted from Gardner and Griffin (1986), and Pötter (1993). 
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transition rate model for ytB which is dependent on ytA as a time-dependent 
covariate.88 Estimating the effects of time-dependent (qualitative and metric) 
processes on the transition rate (or action process) can then easily be achieved by 
applying the method of episode splitting (see Blossfeld, Hamerle, and Mayer 1989; 
Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
Actors, Probabilistic Causal Relations and the Hazard Rate 
If sociological phenomena are always directly or indirectly based on actions of 
individuals, then sociology cannot only deal with associations among variables (e.g. 
pregnancy/birth and marriage) per S8, büt "vith variables that are associated via acting 
people. There are at least three consequences for the empirical analysis of causal 
relations in the social sciences: 
First, if individuals relate causes and effects through their actions, then explanation of 
social processes should be related to individuals (principle of methodological 
individualism). This is why life history data on individuals, and not aggregated 
longitudinal data, provide the most appropriate empirical evidence for hypotheses 
about social change. It is only with these data that one can trace the courses of action 
at the level of each individual over time. 
Second, as discussed in detail above, the explaining or understanding of social 
processes requires (see Elster 1979): (1) a time-related specification of structural con-
straints which cut down the set of abstractly possible courses of action to a vastly 
sm aller subset of feasible actions89 ; and (2) mechanisms that single out which of the 
feasible courses of action shall be realized. Because this is done by individuals, these 
mechanisms must rest on the tastes, beliefs, expectations and constraints of the 
agents. In particular, it must be based on rational- expectations. IIThe term rational-
expectations .... should not be confused with the unrelated concept of rational choice. 
A person giving a rational-expectations response to an intentions question would begin 
by recognizing that future behavior will depend in part on conditions known at the 
survey and in part on events that have not yet occurredll (Manski 1995; 102-103). 
88 The mathematical steps leading to this factorization are, in principle, very easy but 
unfortunately need a complex terminology. The mathematical apparatus will 
therefore not be given here. The mathematics can be found in Blossfeld and 
Rohwer (1995), Gardner and Griffin (1986), Pötter (1993), and Rohwer (1995). An 
important implication is that since not only the states, but also functions of time (e.g. 
duration) can be included conditionally, the distinction between state and rate 
dependence proposed by Tüma and Hannan (1984) loses its meaning (see also 
Pötter 1993). 
89 Here, we must be careful because by taking constraints as given we tend to ignore 
the case that individuals sometimes do not choose among the given alternatives, 
but try to either open more for themselves or close some to other people (see 
Gambetta 1987). 
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However, the future evolutions of these conditions cannot be predicted by the 
respondent with certainty. Thus, if we really want to test propositions derived from 
rational choice models, we have to gather additional time-related data on these 
unobservable entities. Since it is weil known that retrospective questions concerning 
motivational, attitudinal, cognitive or affective states are particularly problematic, the 
collection of panel observations of these states, combined with retrospective 
information on behavioral events since the last panel wave, seems to be an 
appropriate and feasible data collection design.90 
Against such causal analytical studies, it is sometimes argued that since human actors 
act intentionally and behavior is goal-oriented, the intentions or motives of actors to 
bring aboüt some effect in the fütüre caüses the actor to behave in a specific 'Nay in 
the present (Marini and Singer 1988). This does not however contradict our causal 
view. One simply has to distinguish intentions, motives or plans as they occur in the 
present from their impact on the behavior which follows their formation temporally, and 
from the final result, as an outcome of the behavior. An expectation about a future 
state of affairs should clearly be distinguished from what eventually happens in the 
future. Therefore, the fact that social agents can behave intentionally, based on 
expectations, does not reverse the time order underlying our causal statements. 
Third, if it is individuals that are doing the acting, then causa I inference must also take 
into account the free will of individuals.91 This introduces an essential element of 
indeterminacy into causal inferences. Hence, in sociology we can only reasonably 
account for and model the generality but not the determinacy of behavior. The aim of 
substantive (and statistical) models must therefore be to capture common elements 
in the behavior of people, or patterns of action that recur in many cases (Weber 1972; 
Goldthorpe in this volume). Theoretical models in sociology must not seek to explain 
the behavior of single individuals, but the behavior of aggregate entities such as 
groups. In other words, in social science applications, randomness has to enter as a 
defining characteristic of causal models. We can only hope to make sensible causal 
statements about how a given or (hypothesized) change in variable vt (e.g. 
90 In the past, social psychologists in particular have expected too much correspon-
dence between stated intentions and subsequent behavior. They have written that 
intentions and behavior should coincide. For example, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980:50) 
write, "we are claiming that intentions should always predict behavior". Demogra-
phers, on the other hand, have contended that individual-level divergences between 
intentions and behavior should average out in the aggregate. However, in reality, 
both premises are flawed. Intentions and behavior may diverge substantially, both 
at the individual level and in the aggregate, whenever behavior depends on events 
not yet realized at the time of the survey. This is the case even if intentions data 
provide the best predictions of behavior that can be made, given the information 
available when the survey is performed (Manski 1995: 109). 
91 By "free will" of individuals, I mean they are free agents with wills of their own. They 
are not pre-determined by processes which they do not control, but they can act 
according to any idea. 
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pregnancy/birth) in the past affects the probability of a change in variable yrB (e.g. 
marriage) in the future. Correspondingly, the basic causal relation becomes 
In the social sciences, this interpretation seems more appropriate than the traditional 
deterministic approach. The essential difference is not that our knowledge about 
causes is insufficient, allowing only probabilistic statements (see Lieberson 1991), but 
that the causal effect to be explained can only be a probability. Thus, probability in this 
context is not just a technical term anymore, but must be considered a theoretical one: 
it is the propensity of social agents to change their behavior intentionally. 
Using event history data and hazard rate models, the causal reasoning underlying our 
approach can therefore be restated in a somewhat more precise form as 
~yt ~ ~r(t') t < t' 
As a causal effect, the changes in covariates yt in the past may lead to changes in 
the transition rate r(t') in the future, which in turn describes the propensity that the 
actors under study will change their course of action. This causal interpretation 
requires that we take the temporal order in which the structural constraints evolve and 
the actors with their time-related beliefs and motivations seriously. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
During the last 15 years, there has been an explosion of rational choice scholarship 
in the social sciences. The purpose of this paper has been to discuss some of the 
reasons why this development has had surprisingly little influence on large-scale data 
analysis. My thesis is that in the process of establishing rational choice theory as the 
only coherent and unified sociological approach, its proponents have pigeonholed their 
rivals, caricatured competing theories, exaggerated existing theoretical cleavages, 
overlooked their own conceptional weaknesses, downplayed the difficulties of their 
empirical applications, and neglected more recent and actually quite successful 
theoretically driven research programs based on longitudinal data. 
Because rational choice theory is fairly established in sociology today, the chances are 
quite good that the current unproductive dualism between macro-Ievel and micro-Ievel 
approaches could be overcome. Theoretically powerful sociological analyses must pay 
attention to both structural- and micro-Ievel issues. However, not in the usual static 
way. Any macro-micro framework must recognize that time matters in this relationship. 
It must identify the particular historical structures and processes which dominate the 
changes occurring in a given population and it has to specify the causal mechanisms 
that allow us to trace the encounters of intentionally acting individuals with the flow of 
history as aseries of choice processes. An important advancement in this respect has 
been that longitudinal data can be studied by new statistical methods in a stepwise 
time-related fashion. Event history analysis provides effective tools to test causal 
propositions derived fram a dynamic combination of micro- and macro-Ievel 
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considerations. What is still largely missing are more systematic time-related data 
collection efforts based on rational choice conceptions, covering data not only on 
behavior but also on tastes, beliefs, expectations as weil as decisions. This type of 
sociological research is not easy to conduct and is still at its rudimentary beginnings. 
But only such studies will allow us to achieve a more rigorous empirical analysis of 
rational choice propositions and enable us to find out whether rational choice thinking 
really means progress in applied research. 
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Preface 
The 86 project within the Special Collaborative Program on "Status Passages and 
Risks in the Life Course" examines the time-related interplay between macro-
institutional changes (e.g. industrialization, changes in occupational structure, 
educational expansion, expansion of the welfare state), temporal organization of 
individual life courses (e.g. age-grading, timing of job shifts and educational 
attainment) and the formation, continuation and dissolution of households and families. 
The relationship between macro-Ievel structural change and micro-Ievel individual 
rational action is therefore at the heart of the project's theoretical interest. 
In the first part of this paper, 810ssfeld discusses some of the historical reasons why 
the explosion of rational choice scholarship in the social sciences has had surprisingly 
little influence on macro-sociological data analysis. In the second part, he shows that 
any theoretically powerful sociological analysis of a macro-sociological problem must 
pay attention to both structural- and micro-Ievel issues but not in the usual static way. 
Any macro-micro framework must recognize that time is significant in this relationship. 
It must identify the particular historical structures and processes that dominate the 
changes occurring in a given population, and it must specify the causal mechanisms 
that allow us to trace the encounters of intentionally acting individuals with the flow of 
history as aseries of choice processes. Applying the project's research to consensual 
unions, he demonstrates his general theoretical arguments by giving concrete 
examples. 
Prof. Dr. Ansgar Weymann 
Chair, Special Collaborative Programme No. 186 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early 1980s, there has been an explosion of articles and books about the 
need for rational choice approaches in sociology.1 As a consequence of this, rational 
choice theories2 have rapidly grown in complexity and sophistication. Although these 
approaches primarily aim to improve our understanding of real world phenomena, it 
is surprising how little impact they have had on empirical social research in general 
(see, e.g. Green and Shapiro 1994) and on large-scale data analysis in particular 
(Goldthorpe in this volume). 
In this paper, I first want to discuss some of the reasons for this development in the 
field of quantitative macrosociological analysis. My thesis is that the ambitious 
endeavor of rational choice proponents to establish a I new"3 theoretical paradigm in 
sociology has led to the creation of camps and fairly artificial antagonisms between 
a rational choice perspective and all the other types sociological approaches. 
Since rational choice theory is fairly established in sociology today, the time may be 
ripe for more relaxed considerations which could help to overcome an unproductive 
dualism between macro-Ievel and micro-Ievel approaches in the field of large-scale 
data analysis.4 The objective of this paper is to achieve some progress in this respect. 
I contend that only few successful empirical studies of a macrosociological problem 
can concentrate on structural or micro approaches alone. Instead, a theoretically 
powerful sociological analysis must pay attention to both structural- and micro-Ievel 
1 To mention only some of many important publications: Coleman (1986, 1990), 
Coleman and Fararo (1992), Elster (1979, 1986, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c), Esser 
(1990, 1991, 1993), Esser and Troitzsch (1991), Friedman and Hechter (1988), 
Gambetta (1987), Heath (1976), Hechter (1983, 1987), Hedsträm and Swedberg 
(1995), Kiser and Hechter (1991), Lindenberg (1982, 1985, 1989, 1990), Opp 
(1986), Raub and Voss (1981), Voss (1985), Wippler and Lindenberg (1987). 
2 I use the term rational choice theory loosely to include rational action theory (e.g. 
Abell 1992), utilitarian or economic conceptions of man (e.g. Lindenberg 1985), as 
weil as strategie or game-theoretic modes of thinking (e.g. Elster 1979). 
3 Actually, the lines of thought can be traced back to classical authors in econom ics 
and sociology. 
4 For the need to link macro- and micro-perspectives, see Stinchcombe (1968), 
S0rensen (1977), Hechter (1983), Tilly (1984), Granovetter (1985), Coleman (1986), 
Friedman and Hechter (1988), Esser (1991), Oppenheimer (1994), Blau (1994), 
Hedsträm (forthcoming), Hedsträm and Swedberg (in this volume), or Goldthorpe 
(in this volume). 
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issues. However, this macro-micro framework5 must recognize from the outset that 
time matters in this relationship. It must achieve two goals: (1) it must identify the 
particular historical structures and processes which dominate the changes occurring 
in a given population, Le., the sociologically important dependent and independent 
variables;6 and (2) it has to specify the causal mechanisms that allow us to trace the 
encounters of intentionally acting individuals with the flow of history as aseries of 
choice processes. 
The invaluable function of time in this respect is to offer a continuously changing point 
of reference by distinguishing, conceptionally and empirically, between a closed (but 
always changing) past, the respective presentness, and an intrinsically open future. 
Good sociological theories should not only allow us to explain (or understand) a given 
outcome at present with reference to the closed past, but also help us to predict 
outcomes in an uncertain future with reference to the known past and present 
conditions. In my view, the crucial empirical test of sociological theories is not the 
extent to which they help us to explain a given outcome ex post facto, but the degree 
to wh ich they also yield successful predictions of individuals' actions and their 
outcomes ex ante? 
Over the last 15 years, modern longitudinal social research has made great progress 
in assessing causal inferences based on sociological theories more adequately.8 Life 
course and panel studies have collected time-related data over substantial blocks of 
space and historical time. In methodological terms, the most important but still fairly 
unrecognized advancement that has been made is that longitudinal data can be 
studied by new statistical methods in a stepwise time-related fashion. They allow us 
to follow up a great number of individuals belonging to different cohorts over longer 
spans of time and to differentiate at each point in time between a closed past, the 
presentness, and an intrinsically open future (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). My 
intention in this paper is to demonstrate how causal relations suggested by a dynamic 
combination of macro and micro theories can be represented in event history models 
and tested with temporal data. 
5 As I will discuss below, I agree with Blau (1994) that Coleman's (1990) micro-macro 
transition needs to be reversed into a macro-micro transition. 
6 Rather than assume abstractly specified processes such as differentiation, 
individualization, or concentration (see Tilly 1984). 
7 With regard to theory, Elster (1989a) distinguishes determinacy and adequacy. A 
theory is indeterminate when and to the extent that it fails to yield unique 
predictions. It is inadequate when its predictions fail. 
8 In these studies the point of reference that distinguishes a posteriori and a priori is 
not the survey date anymore, but may be any point in time within an observation 
window covered by a longitudinal study (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
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2. Why Has Rational Choice Theory Not Seen Very Successful in Large-Scale Data 
Analysis? 
Let me first consider the reasons for the obvious fact that the influence of rational 
choice theory on quantitative macrosociology has been surprisingly small (see also 
Goldthorpe in this volume). My thesis is that in the process of establishing rational 
choice theory as a "new" theoretical paradigm in sociology, its proponents have tended 
to pigeonhole their rivals, to caricature competing theories, to exaggerate existing 
theoretical cleavages, to overlook their own conceptional weaknesses, to downplay the 
difficulties of their empirical applications, and to neglect more recent and actually quite 
successful theoretically driven research programs based on longitudinal data.9 
Of course, there is not only one single rational choice theory but perhaps as many 
different versions as there are protagonists.10 There has also been an important shift 
from earlier crude models with fairly unrealistic behavioral assumptions towards more 
recent theories elaborating the role of heterogeneous preferences, the effects of 
uncertainty, the impact of structural constraints, the relationship between norms and 
rational choice, and the possibilities of the non-existence of a rational choice. No 
doubt, this development has made rational choice approaches increasingly attractive 
for empirical practitioners. However, the result of the aspiration to establish rational 
choice theory as the only coherent and unified theoretical approach in sociology has 
been the creation of a scientific camp mentality which unfortunately almost completely 
disregards rational choice approach es in large-scale data analysis. Using a concrete 
example of my recent research on consensual unions, I want to demonstrate this in 
more detail here. 
Attacking Outdated and Empirically Unimportant Theories 
Rational choice theorists have frequently been polemical against specific sociological 
conceptions which rarely had but certainly almost completely lost their influence on 
empirical studies today. For example, proponents of rational choice theory enjoy 
criticizing the homo sociologicus 11, extreme normative sociological conceptions 12, 
9 The most important examples are life course, cohort and panel research. 
10 After reviewing the rational choice literature for this paper, I was increasingly 
confused by the great number of obviously contradicting propositions, theoretical 
statements and hypotheses discussed in this field. The only common denominator 
seems to be a commitment to purposive individualism: an epistemological position 
that social phenomena can only be explained in terms of intentional actions of 
individuals. Sut even this position is not shared by all rational choice theorists. 
Some of them do not use individuals as the unit of analysis but treat states or firms 
as corporate actors (see the discussion in Friedman and Hechter 1988). 
11 For example, the critique of Lindenberg (1985, 1990) or Esser (1987, 1989, 1990, 
1991) with regard to the conception of a socially determined homo sociologicus is 
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crude functionalism, or more elaborated models of structural-functionalism 13. But as 
far as I can see, all of these theories, though still discussed in theoretical sociological 
sem inars, have turned out to be fairly irrelevant in contemporary empirical research. 14 
Thus, even if the theoretical critique of rational choice proponents is justified, it could 
not be very consequential for the conduct of concrete empirical social research today. 
I want to demonstrate this point with a concrete example from my recent research 
where my colleagues and I analysed the question of why people living in consensual 
unions marry if there is a pregnancy (Blossfeld, Klijzing, Pohl and Rohwer 1995). In 
an extreme version of the normative model, one would have to assert the dominance 
of normative constraints and simply deny the importance of a choice at all. Thus, with 
the occurrence of a pregnancy in a consensual union, norms would have the effect of 
cutting down the feasible set of actions to a single point, Le. marriage. Today's cohabi-
tating men and women would therefore be portrayed as mindlessly repeating or 
imitating what the ancestors did in the past in similar situations (see Elster 1989b). But 
as a serious theory of marriage action this model is obviously too wrong to merit any 
empirical analysis. Hence, it is not surprising that, to the best of my knowledge, there 
is no empirical researcher who has shaped his/her analysis of this problem on the 
basis of such a strong normative conception. 
Rejecting an extreme normative approach in empirical studies however does not mean 
that norms (and culture) do not matter. Rather it is my view that norms are extremely 
important. Social interactions are intrinsically symbolic relationships that have a mean-
ing and can therefore not be understood without reference to cultural settings. 15 Vet 
in their fierce attempt to push for a duality between an intentionally acting person 
justified, but I actually do not know any contemporary empirical researcher who 
would work with this strong version of the homo sociologicus in his/her empirical 
study. 
12 For example, Elster (1989b) rightly declines the extreme version of the normative 
model because people would then simply stick to prescribed behavior even if new 
and apparently better options become available. But I do not see that such a 
caricature of man as a pure passive executor of inherited norms would be the 
theoretical basis of any empirical analysis today. 
13 For example, Coleman (1986, 1990), Elster (1979) or Hechter (1987) convincingly 
reject functional and structural-functional explanations because these theories have 
no place for individuals, and purpose (or any regulative idea) must be rejected at 
the system level. But which serious empirical research er of social phenomena 
would still employ such theories of the 1960s and early 1970s? 
14 Of course, this observation reflects the huge gap between theory and empirical 
research in today's sociology. 
15 For example, Ferejohn (1991) suggested that rational choice approaches have to 
be complemented by cultural theories to be more successful. 
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guided by instrumental rationality and a passive executor of social norms (or culture), 
rational choice theorists often lose sight of the fact that norms (culture) and rational 
choices are important in empirical applications. 16 The important theoretical issue for 
empirical analyses is therefore not whether social norms (culture) or instrumental 
rationality provide the motivation for actions 17, but how they can be conceptionally 
integrated so that we are better able to understand real life situations. 18 
For example, in the research application mentioned above, values, social norms, and 
traditions certainly have an important impact upon people's marriage behavior in the 
case of a pregnancy, but in most cases this influence is likely to be mediated through 
the intentional actions of individuals. It is therefore olausible that there is a chanaina. 
frequency-dependent19 coexistence of norm-guided behavior and rational, .... se~~ 
centered behavior with regard to the decision to marry when a pregnancy occurs in 
a consensual union (cf. Elster 1989b). In such a hybrid model of empirical application, 
social norms do not dictate the marriage behavior, but allow a deliberate. reflective 
imitation of traditions. This is because social norms normally offer a considerable 
scope of interpretation and manipulation. Social norms' main function might be to 
focus and coordinate expectations (Elster 1989b). Thus, when the norm "If the woman 
gets pregnant, then marry" is still shared within a community, people will to a certain 
degree expect each other to do that. In particular Elster (1989b) has stressed that the 
coordinating function of norms is mainly due to the strong emotions that their violations 
can trigger in the violator hirnself and also in other people. Thus, the social norm "If 
the woman gets pregnant, then marry" is likely to be sustained by the feelings of 
embarrassment, anxiety, guilt and shame that a person suffers at the prospect of 
violating it. Of course, such emotions may or may not help unmarried couples to reach 
a marriage decision when the woman is pregnant, and they certainly will rarely be the 
only motivation for such an important and long-term decision. But this concrete 
research example illustrates that our understanding of the relationship between norms 
and intentional action is only in its rudimentary beginnings and that rational choice 
theory simply must provide better analytical concepts in this regard, if it is to serve as 
a powerful instrument in empirical applications. 
Aspirations to Universal ("Time-Less") Theories 
Many (but fortunately not all) rational choice theorists adopt a rigid version of the 
modern philosophy of science (Green and Shapiro 1994). They strive for general 
16 See, for example, Opp (1986) who comes to a similar conclusion in his empirical 
application. 
17 "Norms do not usefully contrast with self-interest." (Lukes 1991: 148). 
18 See, for example, the interesting papers by Lindenberg (1983), Heiner (1983), and 
Lukes (1991). 
19 The probability that people will follow a social norm at time t' is very likely to be 
dependent on the degree of conformity in a social context at time t (t < t'). 
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causal theories and universallaws (e.g. Lindenberg 1985; Esser 1993) and think little 
about "historicistic analyses" and "inductive generalizations" (e.g. Kiser and Hechter 
1991). Regardless of how one values the merits of historicism and induction in 
sociologjO, by no (Iogical) means are sociologists forced to accept only a choice 
between statements about universallaws or statements about accidental, contingent 
historical relationships. Rather, sociologists can legitimately try to establish causal 
mechanisms of limited generality tailored to a specific range of historical situations 
(e.g. Gambetta 1987; Elster 1989c; Hedström and Swedberg 1995 and in this volume). 
I will develop this perspective in more detail in the next section. 
Yet the strang aspiration to develop general theories and universal laws of social 
action may be one of the reasons why many sociologists consider rational choice 
theory to be empirically unappealing. In particular, the mainstream version of this 
approach "explains" people's rational actions with regard to universal and stable 
general human preferences and considers constraints as exogeneously given (Stigler 
and Becker 1977; Becker 1981; Lindenberg 1985, 1990). However, if preferences are 
universal and stable among individuals (Stigler and Becker 1977; Becker 1981; 
Lindenberg 1985, 1990), they must turn out to be simply irrelevant for explaining differ-
ences in peoples' behavior (Gambetta 1987).21 In this model, individuals' particular 
"tastes" or their marginal utilities, for specific courses of actions can therefore only be 
derived from the constraints (or opportunities) in concrete social situations. Thus, 
econom ically rational individuals may be portrayed as passive agents, with no more 
outstanding intentions than to adjust optimally to changing constraints.22 However, 
without specifying the concrete constraints and their changes in time and space, the 
theoretical model is necessarily empty (Kelle and Lüdemann 1995). The trick is to 
distill into an explanation the important constellation of factors in a situation and their 
relations. The question is not whether to abstract from the complexity of the social 
reality (see e.g. Lindenberg 1985) but whether the appropriate abstraction has been 
done. Thus, "if an abstract theory has explanatory power, this is not merely because 
it is abstract, but because the abstraction in question captures the essence of what 
is going on causally" (Green and Shapiro 1994:191). 
20 As noted by Oppenheimer (1994), good sociological research is normally 
characterized by constantly going back and forth between theoretical and empirical 
analyses (between deduction and induction). 
21 For example, Lindenberg (1985, 1986, 1990) further developed Becker's theory to 
what he calls a "social production function approach 11 , assuming that there are at 
least two ultimate human goals: "physical well-being" and "social approval. lI As a 
third candidate, he also mentioned IIloss-avoidance." However, whether one accepts 
Lindenberg's assumptions about these ultimate goals of man or not is actually not 
important because they do not explain differences in individuals' actions. 
22 Ironically, against the critique of rational choice theorists that the homo sociologicus 
is conceptionalized only as a puppet of structure, one could reply that the homo 
economicus is only a puppet of structural change. 
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This leads us to the next question: What are the important constraints and possible 
alternative courses of actions?23 Because these issues are exogenous to rational 
choice theory, this model must be silent in answering this question. Thus, rational 
choice theory logically presupposes macrotheory to identify the specific historical struc-
tures and processes which produce and change concrete opportunity sets for 
individuals' actions and, one should add, cut down the set of abstractly possible 
courses of action to a vastly sm aller subset of feasible actions (Elster 1979) - making 
choices possible at all24 (see Blau 1994). Blau is therefore right that Coleman's 
micro-macro transition needs to be reversed into a macro-micro transition to represent 
the correct causal nexus (Blau 1994:150).25 To avoid ad hoc formulated "bridge 
assumotions" (Lindenbera 1990)26 about concrete action situations, rational choice 
theory 'needs ~n explicit ;'acrotheory.27 . 
Let me demonstrate this point again using the above application example. The 
economic theory of the family (see Becker 1981) postulates that the general preferenc-
e to marry is basically the same for all actors at all times and places, so that differenc-
es in observed marriage behavior after the occurrence of a pregnancy can only be 
explained by differences in the set of opportunities. But what are the concrete 
opportunities in this specific action situation? Using Becker's economic theory of the 
family, we simply don't know! This universal theory only states that the decision 
whether to marry at all when a pregnancy occurs is related to expectations of what will 
happen within marriage in the future: (1) what the expected gains are (Le. the 
dependencies of partners' utilities on each other28) and (2) how they are going to be 
23 In Lindenberg's (1985) terminology: What are the initial conditions? 
24 There is no choice without alternatives. In the rational choice theory, constraints are 
assumed to be not within the control of the agents. However, human actors always 
have the choice to change these alternatives. This causes Gambetta (1987) to 
argue that rational choice theory is more likely to ask which course of action an 
individual is likely to choose among those open to him, rather than how and when 
individuals will take action for changing the available alternatives. 
25 Of course, this controversy between Blau and Coleman only reflects a very static 
view of the world. As I will develop below, both perspectives are important 
simultaneously. 
26 In the case of empirical social research, it would be better to use the term "bridge 
hypotheses" instead of "bridge assumptions." 
27 This is because these assumptions cannot be deduced from the general rational 
choice model. 
28 In the economic theory of the family, altruism is particularly considered to be an 
important element in the functioning of families. It ties couples together even if only 
one of the partners is altruistic. They then all care about their joint income, and all 
try to maximize it, even the selfish family members. The mechanism that 
guarantees this is the compensatory behavior of transfers from altruists to others. 
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distributed (e.g. to which degree positive assortative mating is associated with 
complementarit!9), and (3) what division of labor they rest on (e.g. the extent of sex-
specific specialization in the household and market sector). Because real actors are 
normally not asked to give answers to these questions, it is easy to see that without 
additional (ad hoc) hypotheses about the various concrete gains of marriage, their 
actually possible distribution among the partners and the history-specific types of 
division of labor between the sexes, this "explanation" is necessarily empty in any 
empirical analysis. Thus, concrete history-specific hypotheses about the constellation 
of constraints (opportunities) are needed in any empirical application. Because rational 
choice theory does not generate them, the researcher is dependent on his/her 
ingenuity. Of course, this opens the door for ad hoc considerations. 
In our concrete research example, the researcher therefore would have to "speculate" 
about the reasons for marriage today. For instance, he/she could contend that 
marriage provides the opportunity for long-run intimacy and emotional support, a 
companionship that, by involving historical continuity, promises memories of a shared 
past (Oppenheimer 1988). It also provides the opportunity for regular (and safer) sex, 
and so on. Most of these returns to marriage not only defy easy quantification, but, 
more important for our current example, these gains could also be obtained within 
long-term consensual unions.3D Why is it then that many of these couples want 
marriage as a setting for having children? In economic terms, one could argue that in 
(West) Germany the tax system rewards non-work or part-time work of one parent and 
since not enough kindergartens, pre-primary schools and daycare institutions are 
provided in (West) Germany, one of the parents (the wife in particular) tends to 
interrupt her/his employment when the child is born, and to a large extent, only re-
enters the labor market again after some lengthy period, if at al1. 31 Thus, the concrete 
(economic) returns to marriage for such couples would be tax reduction and more 
security for the parent (the wife in particular) that leaves the labor market for some 
period. Another reason for men could be that in (West) Germany custody for the child 
Thus, as long as the altruists receive something, selfish family members behave 
altruistically both toward altruists and toward the altruists' other beneficiaries. This 
type of behavior makes it possible to define a family utility function based on the 
altruists' preferences, which everybody wants to maximize. 
29 This means to which degree there is a beneficial effect of one trait on the marginal 
contribution of the other. 
3D It is important to note here that most of the gains of marriage assumed by the 
economic theory of the family can also be realized in consensual unions of modern 
societies. In this sense, the economic theory of the family circumscribes a very 
traditional family system. 
31 Theoretically, husband or wife could interrupt their employment, but empirically it 
is still an exception that husbands stay at home (see Blossfeld, Drobnic and 
Rohwer 1995). 
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is only granted to the married father. However, if the partners get along very weil with 
each other this could be of minor importance. 
In summary, this example demonstrates three interesting points: (1) All of these 
reasons are somehow plausible motivations to get married; (2) they are not specifically 
suggested by rational choice theory; and (3), at least in my view, they are unlikely to 
be the reason for such an important and long-term life course decision as marriage.32 
Thus, rational choice protagonists' endeavor for universal theories comes at a high 
price: theorizing does not arise out of concrete empirical problems anymore and the 
suggested more specific hypotheses often become more or less arbitrary. However, 
it is exactly these specific hypotheses that are of particular interest in any empirical 
study. They help the researcher to understand the situation or to predict individuals' 
concrete actions, and they are the "variables" that typically have to be assessed 
through empirical research. 
Criticizing Empirieist Studies 
When rational choice proponents survey large-scale data studies, they normally focus 
on a very specific type of empirical research that is predominantly non-theoretical, 
methods-driven or simply empiricistic. For example, Esser (in this volume) attacks 
quantitative social research from the perspective that it only tries to "explain" the 
variance of adependent variable by a set of independent variables. 33 True, there are 
many practitioners of quantitative sociology who are uncritically happy when 
associations are found, and the stronger the better.34 However, there are just as 
many competent empirical social scientists who know that this narrow view is wrong 
and unproductive (see Goldthorpe and Ultee in this volume). They are aware of the 
fact that variance explained or high levels of goodness-of-fit statistics do not explain 
anything, only theory does.35 However, in their attacks against non-theoretical and 
merely methods-driven kinds of empirical research, many rational choice protagonists 
tend to throw out the baby with the bathwater and disregard the great number of 
32 For example, in Sweden, a country with a tax system that does not reward dual full-
time marriages and offers better child-care provisions, it is still very common for 
cohabiting couples to marry in the advent of a first birth (see Hoem 1995:46). 
33 See also Coleman (1986) and Freedman (1991). 
34 See the excellent book by Lieberson (1985). 
35 I ronically, the introduction of newer approaches to data analysis - log-linear models, 
logit models, hazard rate models - decreased the danger that applicants will be 
mechanical with respect to "explained variance" because maximum likelihood 
estimation does not provide such a nice measure like R2• Pseudo-R2 measures are 
much less attractive because they depend on the number of observations and 
successive comparisons with likelihood ratio tests can only be relative (and in most 
cases hierarchieal). 
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excellent and theoretically informed quantitative work, particularly in the newly 
developing field of longitudinal data analysis. 
Caricaturing Social Stratification and Mobility Researchers to be Studying Variables 
I nstead of Actors 
Many proponents of rational choice theory have blamed social stratification and 
mobility researchers to be "variable sociologists"36 (e.g. Esser in this volume) 
studying the relationships between variables instead of actors (e.g. Elster 1979; 
Coleman 1986; Boudon 1981; Abbott 1992). Technicallv speaking this is indeed true. 
Using the individual as the unit of analysis,37 stratification researchers ask people 
about their characteristics, things they do, or things that have happened to them. 
These measurements are stored as variables and the relationship among them is then 
analyzed using statistical techniques. However, to contend that structural researchers 
conceptionally treat "variables rather than individuals as the units of analysis" (Boudon 
1981; Esser in this volume) or even "variables as subjects that are doing the action" 
(e.g. Abbott 1992) is more than a caricature of a competing sociological approach. It 
also exaggerates (smalI) existing theoretical cleavages between structural approaches 
and the mainstream version of rational choice theory. 
True, structural researchers theoretically focus on the constraints of individual actions 
rather than on individuals' intentions. They are particularly interested in situations 
where the actions of a great number of individuals are channeled by external con-
straints leaving not much room for the importance of individual choice. For example, 
mobility processes between social classes (e.g. Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992), 
educational opportunities of working class children (e.g. Shavit and Blossfeld 1993), 
mobility constraints for workers in various labor market segments (e.g., Blossfeld and 
Mayer 1988), wage differentials between men and women (e.g. Hannan, Schömann 
and Blossfeld 1990), gender-specific career opportunities (e.g. Blossfeld and Hakim 
forthcoming), structural constraints in the process of family formation (e.g. Blossfeld 
1995) etc. In most such empirical applications structural sociologists do not deny 
choice. Rather they contend that structural constraints affect individual actions by 
determining the objective probabilities that their most preferred aim (e.g. better 
educational attainment, higher income, career advancement, better life etc.) can be 
realized. Thus, structural constraints make some desired aims easy for individuals to 
attain; they make other goals more difficult to attain and, in extreme cases, they 
preclude the attainment of specific ends altogether (Friedman and Hechter 1988). For 
example, the role of consensual unions was quite different in the former Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Oemocratic Republic (GOR) (see 
Blossfeld/Klijzing/Pohl/Rohwer 1995) because of different structural constraints. In the 
36 In German the term is "Variablensoziologen" (see Esser in this volume). 
37 We neglect inequality studies based only on aggregated data because they are 
rarely used today. Most social structural and mobility studies are based on 
individual data. 
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GOR after the late 1970s there was a structural reason not to marry in the event of 
a child because these unmarried mothers had privileged access to daycare institutions, 
had Ion ger paid maternity leaves, and had a better opportunity to stay at home and 
take care of sick children (Huinink 1994). Therefore, in the GOR more than 50% of 
first births took place out of wedlock in the late 1980s, whereas in the FRG, the 
respective figure was still below 10% at the end of the 1980s (Pohl et al. 1992). In 
addition, mothers who were enrolled in school received better daycare service for their 
children and privileged access to student's homes etc. And this explains why there is 
no significant effect of educational attainment and school enrollment on entry into 
marriage and motherhood for East Germany. In the GOR, a pregnancy was no danger 
for the school career. as has been the case for West Germanv. 
- - - - - - - - - -- - - I - - - - - - - - - - - - - J 
It is also true that in structural studies the assumptions about actors are often left 
implicit (Gambetta 1987). However, because structural sociologists normally accept, 
implicitly or explicitly, the rationality assumption (lIpeople act reasonablell ) as weil as 
the presumption that individuals strive for similar ends (e.g. better educational 
attainment, higher income, career advancement, better life etc.), they simply consider 
the intervening action orientation of individuals as fairly uninteresting compared to the 
impact of structural constraints. Thus, one could contend that their explanations only 
seem to be lIincompletell (e.g., as contended by Esser in this volume) because it would 
make little difference for our understanding of individuals' actions, if a structural 
explanation of possible courses of action were explicitly added to a highly sophisti-
cated choice model or not. 
To some extent, this discussion also shows that the distinction between an econo-
m ist's (e.g. Stigler and Becker 1977)38 explanation39 on the one hand and the 
explanation of a structural sociologist on the other becomes obscure. In both 
approaches changing constraints are extremely important. However, in my view, the 
approach of the structural sociologist is theoretically superior because it does not 
consider the changes in the constraints as theoretically external or assumed to be 
given. Rather it tries to identify and conceptualize the relevant structural alternatives 
in an evolving social world. 
Problems of Predicting Courses of Action 
As summarized by Elster (1989a), rational choice theory conceives the actor as a 
decision-maker who successfully achieves three optimizing operations: IIfinding the 
best action, for given beliefs and desires; forming the best-grounded belief, for given 
evidence; and collecting the right amount of evidence, for given desires and prior 
beliefs ll (Elster 1989a:4). 
38 But also adopted by sociologists (see e.g. Lindenberg 1985). 
39 Assuming that only opportunity costs differ, so that IInew tastesll could be derived 
from the change of specific constraints, given general human preferences. 
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Early rational choice models have not been very attractive for practitioners of empirical 
research because they suppressed most real-world complexities of the decision 
situation by unrealistic behavioral assumptions (see Goldthorpe and Ultee in this 
volume). In order to derive "elegant" models, scientists assumed that preferences and 
constraints are given and that the actors are fully informed about all possible courses 
of actions, and about their consequences as weil as the likelihood of events. It can be 
shown that all sorts of behavior are consistent with or plausibly suggested by these 
types of choice models. However, not surprisingly, they have not been very successful 
in predicting peoples' behavior empirically. 
Predictions of empirical courses of action might fail in such rational choice models 
because of two reasons: (1) people may act irrational and/or (2) the real-world 
situations in which people try to behave rationally are much more complex than 
assumed in the theoretical model. 
Let me first discuss the case where people behave irrationally. In this case, individuals 
do not carry out the action that is best for their given beliefs and desires; they do not 
form the best-grounded beliefs for given evidence or do not collect the right amount 
of evidence for given desires and prior beliefs. Although irrationality is quite wide-
spread, I will not discuss it any further here. The reason is that we are not interested 
in determining the actions of particular individuals but in explaining the general 
regularities which govern the actions of many people (see Goldthorpe in this volume). 
At this aggregated level however the rationality assumption plays a privileged role --
not only because most people normally want to be rational, but also because the 
prediction of the behavior of aggregates will most likely be successful if we assume 
that, by and large, people act rationally (Elster 1989a).40 As Stinchcome (1968) has 
shown, the behavior of large aggregates can also be comprehended reasonably weil, 
even when the individual components of the aggregates are poorly understood. Given 
this macro-Ievel focus, small idiosyncratic deviations of individuals from the postulated 
rational model are not damaging for sociological predictions (Hedström forthcom-
ing).41 Aggregate intentions are also apt to be much more stable than individual 
intentions over time (Ajzen 1985). See, for example, the studies about the number of 
children women planned to have (Bumpass and Westoff 1969;; Westoff and Ryder 
1977). They showed that at the individual level only 41 % of the women had exactly 
the number of children they had planned. On the average, however, the women's 
actual family size (3.3 children) was found to correspond precisely to the intended 
family size (also 3.3 children) (Bumpass and West off 1969). 
40 And even if we conclude that irrationality offers the best explanation of a given kind 
of group behavior, then most of the evidence about the agents that go es into that 
conclusion is formed on the assumption that they are, by and large, rational (Elster 
1989a). 
41 Thus, rational choice explanations need not be derivable from postulates about 
psychological states of individuals. However, they m ust be compatible with 
optimizing assumptions about the intentions of individuals (Green and Shapiro 
1994). 
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For empirical applications in sociology, it is more interesting to discuss prediction 
failures of rational choice theory because real-life situations are much less determinate 
than assumed in the restrictive theoretical models. Following Elster (1989a), such 
uncertainties can arise at three levels. 
First, the actions of individuals may not be easily predictable because individuals are 
unable to compare and rank all possible courses of action. This problem is particularly 
severe when individuals know little about the alternatives themselves to make a 
rational decision. For example, it is hard for people to compare and rank rationally 
different future educational tracks, alternative job careers, differences in long-term 
marriages with various partners etc. because they simply do not know much about 
these alternatives in future. Thus, when decisions have to be made to prefer one 
future mode of life to another, more peripheral considerations often come to the fore 
to motivate adecision (Elster 1989a). In this sense, one could argue in our particular 
research example that couples living in consensual unions do know little about their 
concrete marital lives in future (Burkart 1994) so that they have to motivate their 
marriage decisions by more IIperipheral reasonsll like tax reduction and more security 
for the wife that leaves the labor market for some period. But there is not only the 
question of whether to marry. Equally important is an answer to the question of when 
the right time for marriage iso If future possible alternatives (with other marriage 
partners) are not yet known, there is also the problem of when to make the optimal 
decision with regard to these (still unknown) alternatives. There is always an incentive 
to postpone a marriage decision because other possible marriage partners might be 
more attractive, but postponing marriage forever clearly might not be optimal for an 
individual who would like to marry. On the other hand, there is also the danger that 
the current possible marriage partnre opts for another partner making it attractive to 
marry earlier. Thus, in many situations people have to introduce a mechanism that 
triggers off adecision at a specific point in time. For example, couples ready for 
marriage could decide not to use contraceptives anymore and simply wait to see what 
happens. The IIchance eventll of a pregnancy could then be used as a motivation to 
determine the concrete timing of entry into marriage. 
Second, the behavior of actors may be hard to predict, as there could be uncertainties 
with regard to their beliefs. This means that individuals are not able to reliably assign 
probabilities of possible results of their future courses of action. With respect to the 
previously mentioned research example, men and women living in consensual unions 
will have problems in predicting the future gains of marriage, how they will be 
distributed amongst them and what division of labor they will rest on. Under such 
uncertainties, rational choice theory is quite limited. As noted by Elster (1989a), this 
problem is particularly severe when adecision requires beliefs about choices to be 
made by other people in future, as is the case in our research example where each 
prospective marriage partner m ust have long-term beliefs about the future choices to 
be made by the respective other one. 
Finally, problems arise with regard to the optimal amount of information one should 
collect before forming an opinion. Collecting information is necessary, but costly and 
time- consum ing. Unfortunately, it is often not possible to estimate probable marginal 
costs and benefits for further information searches. Therefore, actors sometimes set 
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certain tolerance limits for themselves which, when satisfied, stop the search for 
additional information (Simon 1954, Esser 1991). Thus, in our example, cohabitation 
could be interpreted as a temporary trial period before marriage (Manting 1994). The 
problem of each partner is to then decide how long he/she should further collect 
information about the respective other person in daily life situations until a reasonable 
marriage decision can be made.42 Also in this case, the event of a pregnancy can 
help the couples to stop further information searches about each other and push them 
to make up their m inds. 
In summary, in many empirical applications of large-scale data analysis rational choice 
theory can be attacked as a quite powerless theory when one wants to derive 
unambiguous predictions because of the absence of well-defined sets of alternatives 
and their consequences, information processing limitations in computing optima from 
known preference and utility information or unreliable probability informations. Thus, 
in my view, the usefulness of rational choice theory for typical empirical applications 
in macro sociology is crucially dependent on the extent to which this approach is able 
to incorporate various forms of unresolved value conflicts and the consequences of 
uncertainty. 
Heiner (1983), for example, argues that the limits to maximizing actually become the 
origin of predictable behavior. He suggests that the observed regularities of actions 
should be understood as "behavioral rules" that arise because of uncertainty in distin-
guishing preferred from less-preferred behavior. Uncertainty requires actions to be 
governed by mechanisms that restrict the flexibility to choose potential courses of 
actions, or which produce a selective alertness to information that might prompt 
particular courses of actions to be chosen. These mechanisms will simplify behavior 
to less-complex patterns, which are easier to recognize and to predict (by the actors 
themselves and, of course, by the social scientist!). According to Heiner (1983), 
predictable behavior will evolve to the extent that uncertainty prevents agents from 
successfully maximizing. Greater uncertainty will cause behavioral rules to be more 
restrictive in eliminating particular actions or response patterns to potential information. 
Heiner (1983) interprets social institutions or social norms as such rule-mechanisms 
for dealing with recurrent situations faced by individuals (see also Lindenberg 1983; 
Esser 1991; Lukes 1991 ).43 They enable each actor (and the social researcher!) in 
modern societies to know less and less about the behavior of the other individuals and 
about the complex interdependence generated by their interaction. 
42 Interestingly, many empirical studies on the role of cohabitation in the divorce 
process show that people who have cohabited before marriage have much lower 
marital stability than couples who did not cohabit before marriage (Hoem and Hoem 
1988; Bumpass and Sweet 1989; Schoen 1992; Klijzing 1992; Manting 1994). This 
suggests a self-selection process, in which couples with a high dissolution rate 
select themselves into consensual unions before marriage. 
43 See also the work on "habits" and "framing" (e.g. Lindenberg 1990; Esser 1990). 
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Another way to reduce choice complexity under uncertainty is that individuals attempt 
to constrain or bind the flexibility of their own future actions (Elster 1979). This line of 
argument offers a more general explanation for the marriage decision in our research 
example. It could be developed round the idea that having children is an irreversible, 
long-term, joint project that constrains the behavior of both partners (and that of the 
woman in particular). On the one hand, a child decreases the chan ces of finding a 
new potential partner for both women and for men. There is a greater need for stability 
for both partners because later possible matches may not be as desirable as the 
current one. This risk is probably greater for women, given their tendency to be 
responsible for children (Oppenheimer 1988; Blossfeld, Manting, and Rohwer 1993). 
In addition, if quality of children (Becker 1981) is an important desire of individuals; 
then this dramatically will constrain the future behavior of both partners. A major 
difficulty of making this joint long-term project a successful one, however, lies in 
forecasting the own future behavior and the future behavior of the cohabiting partner 
on the basis of the incomplete information currently available. This suggests that the 
decision to marry depends partlyon how weil the individuals can predict their own and 
their partner's future lives. One rational way of making oneself act in favor of the joint 
long-term project in future is to induce a belief from which that course of action will 
follow compellingly (Elster 1979). From this point of view, marriage could be seen as 
a precommitment to bind oneself at present in order to increase the probability that 
one will carry out a certain (honorable or responsible) behavior with regard to the child 
and the partner in the future. As noted by Elster (1979), the crucial point here is that 
the expected change in the probability of the later course of action is the motive for 
marriage -- not an unintended effect, nor a predictable and not unwelcome effect. 
Marriage as a means of precommitment is also a natural technique for lending credibil-
ity to promises for the partner (Elster 1979). Thus, it might be individually rational to 
follow the norm "If the woman gets pregnant, then marry" because it lends credibility 
to promises that otherwise would be less believable. Hence, an important condition for 
predictable behavior is making credible communications about what one will do under 
future circumstances.44 These credible promises enable the partners to cooperate 
more than they would have otherwise done. There can be three reasons why 
unmarried partners are expected to behave more honorably when they are married 
under unforseen circumstances in the future: (1) Marriage instead of cohabitation is 
not considered to be a trial period;45 (2) marriage compared to cohabitation has a 
44 It goes without saying that the partners are free to bind themselves through a 
marriage contract to protect their "deeper" values against their more impulsive ones 
(see Elster). 
45 There is plenty of empirical evidence that the period of cohabitation in modern 
societies is still dominated by a "weeding process" (Klijzing 1992). 
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much higher level of stability,46 and (3) the dissolution of a marital contract involves 
much higher transaction costs than the dissolution of a consensual union.47 
Neglecting the Dynamics of Historical Processes 
Although the framework of rational choice theory is inherently dynamic (Linden berg 
1985),48 most of its proponents have not really taken the time-relatedness of social 
processes seriously. Rather they prefer logical reconstructions of "time-Iess" action 
situations (see, e.g. Esser 1991). This is because much rational choice scholarship is 
(very often implicitly) an Aquilibrium ~nalysi~ IJnder ~tatir. conrHtion~ (Green and 
Shapiro 1994; Ultee in this volume).49 It is simply assumed that such choice situa-
tions can be arbitrarily abstracted from a continuous social process, involving two 
unproblematic sets of factors: preferences and (perceived) action opportunities 
(Hedström forthcoming).50 The problem of this "ahistorical approach 11 is the implicit 
assumption that subsections of the social process have clear beginnings, middles, and 
ends.51 But this does not hold for entities such as societies. For them, as noted by 
Abbott (1992), there is only an endless middle. Societies consist of a continuous 
stream of historical events and sets of situational consequences flowing from those 
events. Thus, when we conduct an empirical study, the historical process is always 
ongoing and this poses difficult theoretical and empirical specification problems with 
46 All studies show that marriages have a much higher level of stability (e.g. Klijzing 
1992; Hoem 1995). 
47 Based on this analysis, one could offer a speculative argument about the changing 
significance of marriage as a credible promise: If cohabitation loses its meaning as 
a trial period, changes its character with increasing stability, or if the costs of 
divorce are reduced, then this will tend to erode the chances of making a credible 
promise by the act of marriage and lead to fewer marriages in the case of pregnan-
cies in consensual unions. 
48 For example, Becker's (1975, 1981) theory of human capital and his economic 
theory of the family, or more dynamic game theoretical considerations with several 
iterations. 
49 Sometimes also a comparative-static analysis is used, where it is assumed that the 
direction on which an equilibrium is expected to move in response to exogenous 
changes in ends, beliefs, or environmental constraints is known. 
50 It is not by chance that many rational choice theorists assume preferences and 
constraints simply as given. In this conception only the future counts and the past 
does not seem to be important. 
51 In rational choice theory, this assumption also applies to subsections of the 
individual life course. 
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regard to the preferences and constraints at any point in time.52 Of course, as 
discussed above, many rational choice scholars simply assume preferences and con-
straints as unproblematically given, and they unrealistically pretend that social 
processes are in equilibria or, at least, always move swiftly towards them after an 
external upheaval is introduced (see Ultee in this volume).53 However, after more 
than 20 years of empirical life course and cohort research, these assumptions seem 
to me more than peculiar and outdated. 
Thus, when we study the dynamics of action situations both empirically and 
theoretically, we should instead start with the idea that we artificially open an 
observ;:ttion window with regard to an already continuously flowing stream of social 
history. It is therefore impossible to empirically study the social process from scratch; 
this should be recognized and also reflected in analytical terms.54 There is always 
a previous history before any history. Therefore, two questions become important: (1) 
How can we conceptualize and measure the genesis of individuals' preferences and 
the social constraints to which people are exposed up to the point in time when we 
begin to study an action situation? and (2) How do preferences and constraints 
develop over time within an (empirical or conceived) observation window? 
The first question is of crucial importance because most sociological research must 
be based on non-experimental observations of social processes, and these processes 
are highly selective and historically specific (Lieberson 1985). One of the important 
contributions of life course studies has been to make macrosociology more sensitive 
towards these issues. This research focuses on peoples' life courses because at least 
these entities have a clear beginning, middle and end in the flow of history.55 In 
particular, these studies demonstrated in many empirical analyses that the following 
considerations are important for our understanding of the social process (e.g., 
Blossfeld 1989, 1995; Mayer and Tuma 1990; Huinink 1993): (1) Life courses are 
highly time-related, selective, and cumulative processes that are molded by history-
specific institutions and culture as weil as by purposive individuals; (2) life courses 
always emerge and change under particular historical conditions that have to be 
carefully considered (period effect); (3) in modern societies, successive generations 
52 In event history analysis this methodological problem is called "Ieft censoring" 
(Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
53 The equilibrium assumptions in economics and sociology have often taken attention 
away from a serious interest in processes of change in the social system (Tuma 
and Hannan 1984). 
54 It is indeed interesting to see how sociologists and rational choice proponents in 
particular have theorized about the question of how social order is possible at all. 
Most of them seem to believe that it would be possible and meaningful to develop 
an analytical model that restarts the social process from scratch. 
55 Making the theoretical and empirical specification of constraints and preferences 
less vulnerable. 
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start and experience their life courses in very different historical settings and therefore 
differ markedly (cohort effect); (4) individuals are affected by various parallel processes 
at different levels (Le., there are multiple clocks and point-in-time events at the micro, 
intermediate and macro level); (5) not only the type of event (e.g. pregnancy) but also 
its timing is of importance for the courses of action (e.g. marriage); and (6) time-
dependencies in specific states can be interpreted as expressions of dynamic causal 
processes or diffusion processes56. 
The second question of how preferences and constraints develop within an 
observation window is equally important because the processes just mentioned do not 
come to a halt at the beginning of an observation window. Individuals' actions must 
therefore be studied from the perspective that they interact with these processes over 
time. Thus, the interdependencies of individuals' social actions and structural 
processes at different levels have to be reconstructed. 
Let's demonstrate this aspect again based on our example where the woman gets 
pregnant in a consensual union. With regard to the marriage decision, it seems to be 
important to distinguish two completely different situations at the time of the discovery 
of the pregnancy: (1) the preferences of the partners to marry are vague and diffuse; 
and (2) the couple already has had reached adecision to marry or not to marry in the 
case of child. 
Diffuse marriage preferences and the negotiation process: For many couples in 
modern societies, the preferences towards marriage might be quite vague and diffuse 
at the beginning of the pregnancy, so that through the occurrence of a pregnancy a 
process of preference formation and persuasion might be initiated (Elster 1989c). 
Formation means that initially relatively vague preferences with regard to marriage are 
formed, resulting in more clear-cut preferences in a step-wise negotiation process. 
Persuasion means that an individual is led by a sequence of short-term improvements 
into preferring marriage over non-marriage, even if he/she initially vaguely preferred 
non-marriage over marriage.57 In such cases, the discovery of a pregnancy 
engenders a process of change in preferences. This process of preference formation 
and persuasion will be very time-structured due to two reasons. On the one hand, the 
opportunity to legalize the birth of the child tends to decrease with the duration of 
pregnancy. At the same time the likelihood of possible medical complications 
(premature birth, be laid up with health problems, etc.) connected with the pregnancy 
and the visibility of pregnancy to other people increases. Hence, the optimal time for 
marriage, in the sense of the smallest risk of medical complications connected with the 
pregnancy and the visibility of the pregnancy to other people, is at a relatively early 
pregnancy phase. On the other hand, the optimum in the sense of a safe, well-thought 
through decision based on a negotiation process between the partners is often at a 
56 Based on the idea that some sort of IIcontagion ll , lIinfectionll , lIimitation ll , IIconformi-
ty", IIbandwagon", "norm effects", or simply social pressure drives the process under 
study (see Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995; Manski 1995). 
57 Or the other way around. 
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relatively later phase of the pregnancy.58 Thus, there is a constant tension between 
these often opposing forces in the attempt to optimize the marriage timing, a tension 
that may often but not necessarily be connected with a considerable shift in 
preferences with regard to marriage. Based on these contradictory forces on the 
marriage decision process, one would expect that the rate of entry into marriage after 
the discovery of pregnancy at first increases with the duration of pregnancy and then, 
after reaching some maximum, decreases again as the time of birth comes closer. Of 
course, shortly before and after the birth, one would expect a very low marriage rate. 
Finally, after the birth has already taken place out of wedlock, the decision of whether 
or not to marry has a different quality. The child is then already "illegitimate", and the 
time pressure to marry has disappeared.59 Thus, one has to again expect a relative 
low marriage rate some time after the birth of the child. The results of the empirical 
analysis of Blossfeld, Klijzing, Pohl and Rohwer (1995) show that after having con-
trolled for several important covariates, West German women do indeed seem to 
follow this pattern with respect to the rate of entry into marriage. This interpretation of 
the time-dependence within the observation window is derived from a theoretically 
supposed underlying negotiation process model at the level of the non-marital couples, 
leading to a formation and perhaps a change in initially still unstructured preferences 
for marriage.60 
Marriage decisions and the observed rate of entry into marriage: Of course, one could 
also argue that many couples had already decided to marry or not to marry when the 
pregnancy was first discovered. Thus, couples would in fact be extremely heteroge-
neous with regard to their baseline rate to enter into marriage when the pregnancy is 
observed. For example, if the consensual union population consists of two groups -
one with a constantly low marriage rate61 and the other with an increasing rate as 
pregnancy progresses62 - this neglected (or unobserved) heterogeneity will then 
58 It is very likely that after some time, there is a cut-off point where calculation stops 
and the partners simply have to make a still unsupported choice. This point might 
just as weil be as Glose to the childbirth as possible. 
59 One could argue that the next important date that exerts pressure to reconsider the 
marriage decision is new pregnancy or the time of entry into school. 
60 The time-dependent dummy variables in the study of Blossfeld, Klijzing, Pohl and 
Rohwer (1995) therefore served as proxies for a theoretically important process that 
is hard (or even impossible) to measure. 
61 Only in extreme cases would one expect a marriage rate of zero. 
62 For couples who have already reached adecision to marry in the event of 
pregnancy there is the additional pressure to really go through with it due to the 
increasing risks of medical complications connected with the pregnancy (e.g. 
premature births) and the visibility of the pregnancy to other people. This will, of 
course, lead to an increasing marriage rate with the progression of pregnancy. 
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result in a bell-shaped marriage rate in the observation window, too (Blossfeld and 
Rohwer 1995). This is because at the progression of pregnancy, the composition63 
of the unmarried couples shifts towards couples being "Iess ready for marriage" or 
being "not ready for marriage" which, at first, increases and then decreases the 
observed rate pattern.64 
To be able to examine these theoretical interpretations, one would need in addition to 
the usual available "objective" data about facts and events (Le. the dates of entry into 
pregnancy and marriage), time-related information about partners' beliefs with regard 
to their possible future marriages and their expected outcomes, the information these 
actors actually take into account in making decisions; and the results of these 
decisions themselves (see, e.g. Liefbroer and Oe Jong-Gierveld 1993) 65. Thus, for 
studies aiming to model individuals' choices and behavior over time, panel observa-
tions of beliefs, expectations and available information states, combined with retro-
spective information on behavioral events since the last sweep, appear to be a very 
desirable design (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
3. A Oynamic Integration of Micro- and Macro-Perspectives 
In this section, I want to develop a more systematic sketch of how causal relations 
suggested by a dynamic combination of macro and m icro theories can be represented 
in event history models and then be better examined with temporal data. 
Max Weber's Pioneering Work 
The epistemological justification for a combination of micro- and macro-Ievel 
approaches rests on Max Weber's ideas that complete sociological explanations have 
63 See also OeGraf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath (1995) for a similar discussion with 
respect to voting behavior. 
64 Thus, if we do not know whether the couples have already reached adecision to 
marry in the case of a child at the time of pregnancy, we are not able to say 
whether the effects of the dummy variables must be considered as proxies for the 
formation of couples' decisions during pregnancy or for the heterogeneity of 
couples' marriage decisions at the beginning of pregnancy. Obviously, both interpre-
tations may be valid in reality. However, the important conclusion is that the 
discovery of a pregnancy leads to achanging marriage rate for most couples within 
the observation window, 
65 It is very important to also record the timing of decisions. For example, it could 
happen that a couple first decides to marry; then, following this decision, the woman 
becomes pregnant, and finally the couple marries. In this case, we would observe 
pregnancy occurring before marriage and assume that pregnancy increases the 
likelihood of marriage. However, the time order between the events is exactly the 
other way around: the couple decides to marry and then the woman gets pregnant. 
24 
to combine two different methods66: Erklären (the establishment of statistical 
associations between observable events67) and Verstehen (the theoretical specifica-
tion of relationships between observable events, typical actors' intentions and their 
purposive actions). Consequently, successful sociological explanations must rely on 
both, on empirical correlations between events and causal mechanisms helping us to 
understand why people in specific situations act in a typical way producing a statistical 
relationship (Elster 1989c; Stinchcombe 1991; Kiser and Hechter 1991; Hedström and 
Swedberg 1995 and in this volume). 
Sociological explanations can therefore fail in two respects: (1) If we are not in a 
position to say something about the frequency (or probability) of a specific type of 
situation and its outcomes, then we cannot assess the sociological relevance or 
explanatory power of a supposed causal mechanism, regardless of how weil we 
theoretically understand a particular situation;68 and (2) if we are not able to specify 
a theoretical mechanism, then we cannot understand the sociological meaning of an 
observed covariation between variables, independently of how strong this association 
may be.69 Of course, to avoid pure storytelling (Hedström forthcomingfO, a causal 
66 "Kausale Erklärung bedeutet also die Feststellung: daß nach einer irgendwie 
abschätzbaren, im - seltenen - Idealfall: zahlenmäßig angebbare, Wahrscheinlich-
keitsregel auf einen bestimmten beobachteten (inneren oder äußeren) Vorgang ein 
bestimmter anderer Vorgang folgt ... Eine richtige kausale Deutung eines konkreten 
Handeins bedeutet: daß der äußere Ablauf und das Motiv zutreffend und zugleich 
in ihrem Zusammenhang sinnhaft verständlich erkannt sind. Eine richtige kausale 
Deutung typischen Handeins ... bedeutet: daß der als typisch behauptete Hergang 
sowohl (in irgendeinem Grade) sinnadäquat erscheint wie (in irgendeinem Grade) 
als kausal adäquat festgestellt werden kann. Fehlt die Sinnadäquanz, dann liegt 
selbst bei größter und zahlenmäßig in ihrer Wahrscheinlichkeit präzis angebbarer 
Regelmäßigkeit des Ablaufs ... nur eine unverstehbare ... statistische 
Wahrscheinlichkeit vor. Andererseits bedeutet für die Tragweite soziologischer 
Erkenntnisse selbst die evidenteste Sinnadäquanz nur in dem Maß eine richtige 
kausale Aussage, als der Beweis für das Bestehen einer (irgendwie angebbaren) 
Chance erbracht wird, daß das Handeln den sinnadäquat erscheinenden Verlauf 
tatsächlich mit angebbarer Häufigkeit oder Annäherung (durchschnittlich oder im 
'reinen' Fall) zu nehmen pflegt." (Weber 1972:5-6). 
67 Of course, this association should not be spurious. 
68 Rational choice theorists often start their explanations at the individual level, and 
they do not pay any attention as to whether these situations actually recur in 
approximately the same form. Thus, they may understand the situation but simply 
fail to establish the sociological importance of their models. 
69 Very often sociologists using cross-sectional data and sophisticated methods of 
data analysis (Iike regression equations, path analyses, and structural equation 
models), only seek to "explain" the variation in the dependent variable (e.g. the 
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mechanism cannot be an ad hoc-interpretation or simply an ideographie account; and, 
as discussed above, to evade substantive emptiness, it can also not be a universal, 
"time-Iess" law (Elster 1989c)?1 Rather sociological mechanisms should be consid-
ered as elementary theoretical building blocks of limited generality tailored for a 
specific range of historical situations.72 Thus, the term causal is not used here in the 
traditional meaning with regard to universal. "time-Iess" laws. It is based on systematic 
temporal variations and patterned regularities that themselves are a legitimate focus 
of our sociological understanding. This important difference will be made clearer 
below. The function of macro-Ievel theories is to ass ist us in identifying the relevant 
structural events (or variables);73 the task of micro-Ievel theories is to help us to 
explain why there is a relationship between them.74 
proportion of variance explained). Thus, these sociologists establish the generality 
of a pattern but are unable to understand the relationship. 
70 I believe that all sociological explanations somehow have a character of storytelling. 
71 Several proponents of rational choice theory emphasize the importance of 
nomological laws in sociology (e.g. the works of Esser and Lindenberg). For 
example, they postulate that actors perceive courses of action and choose the 
action that maximizes (optimizes) their expected utility. However, as discussed 
above, for an empirical analysis of a concrete action situation this theory is empty 
because it is silent with regard to the concrete courses of perceived actions, their 
various utilities and the subjective probabilities attached to them (Kelle and 
Lüdemann 1995). 
72 The advancement of sociology could then be seen in a growing body of "knowledge 
of ever-more mechanisms rather than ever-better theories" (Elster 1989c). 
73 For example, macro theories may point our attention to specific processes like 
educational expansion, changes in the occupational, job or class structure, 
restructuring processes in the labor market, changing rates of unemployment, 
modernization processes, trends in the household structure or the dynamics of 
family types. 
74 For example, the rational actor model may be used to represent the principles 
guiding the actors' behavior in responding to macro trends and changes (Hedström 
forthcoming). It may help us to understand how a specific combination of individual 
desires, beliefs, and changes in action opportunities generate a specific action 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1995 and in this volume). 
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The Dynamics of Observed and Unobserved Processes 
In my view, many of the fruitless debates and misunderstandings with regard to the 
relationship of macro- and micro-levef5 issues are due to the fact that sociologists 
often use "time-Iess" analytical terms and construct "time-Iess" theoretical models. But 
only if we take the time dimension more seriously, is it possible to recognize that in 
the dynamic interplay of structural events and individuals' choices, there is always an 
"earlier" and "Iater" that has to be defined in terms of past, present, and future (Prior 
1967). "Time-Iess" theoretical thinking76 neglecting the timing in the relationships 
necessarily will produce aporias, paradoxical problems, and belief controversies 
among scientists. For example, the debate of what is more important for a sociologist, 
institutional embeddedness or individual action (e.g. Lindenberg 1995; Coleman 1990; 
Blau 1994), is obviously an unnecessary question, as is the one about whether 
individuals' preference change engenders change in the social structure, or whether 
structural change leads to changing preferences. There can be no doubt that both 
aspects are important: institutional embeddedness and individual action, individual 
preferences and social structure - but there is always a time order of events in this 
relationship. For example, the claim that explaining behavior by reference to different 
preferences would be tautological (see Friedman and Hechter 1988) is, of course, only 
true in a time-Iess conception where preferences are equated with behavior. 77 
However, when the dynamics of preferences and behavior respectively are measured 
over time, then this is not the case anymore. Actually, it seems to me that this is the 
only fruitful approach to empirically test propositions derived from rational choice 
models. Thus, we have to strive for reliable and valid time-related measures of the 
unobserved entities like tastes, beliefs, decision rules etc. (see Green and Shapiro 
1994).78 In particular, we must collect data on rational expectations predictions of 
individuals' future behavior.79 
75 Blau (1994) correctly stresses that simplistic conceptions of only two levels may be 
highly misleading. Complex social structures normally consist of multiple levels of 
structure. 
76 Normally nurtured by the inferentiallimitations of cross-sectional data analysis (see 
Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
77 It is interesting that rational choice proponents and economists in particular (see 
Manski 1995) often question the validity of measures other than behavior - actual 
choices - as indicators of preferences, tastes and beliefs (see Green and Shapiro 
1994). 
78 Of course, this is a Pandora's box that cannot be adequately discussed in this 
paper (see, e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Ajzen and Madden 1986; Ajzen 1989; 
Henerson, Morris and Fitz-Gibbon 1988; Manski 1995). 
79 These are respondents' best predictions of their behavior including information 
about (1) the awareness of the respondents about the actual process determining 
their future behavior and (2) the knowledge they possess at the the respective point 
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The Dynam ics of Parallel Processes at Different Levels. 
To make progress in the understanding of the dynamics of social action, we have to 
develop a sociological perspective that stresses such changes (or events) and their 
historical context. Actors should be conceptualized as individuals who intentionally 
decide between discrete courses of action, and these decisions and their possibly later 
following actions can occur at any point in time. If the dependent variable is discrete, 
like the outcomes of choices, and can change its state at any time, then a transition 
rate framework offers a time-point-related representation for causal effects (Blossfeld 
and Rohwer 1995). 
A continuous time path of discrete intentional actions (or events) of an individual in 
one domain of life might be called a process. This process is normally embedded in 
a complex system of other parallel processes. These can operate at different levels. 
For example: 
1. there can be parallel processes at the level of the individual in different domains 
of life (e.g. one may ask how upward and downward moves in an individual's job 
career influence his/her intentional actions in the family), cf. e.g. Blossfeld and 
Huinink (1991), and Blossfeld (1995); 
2. there may be parallel processes at the level of some few individuals interacting 
with each other (e.g. one might study the effect of the careers of the husband on 
his wife's purposive participation in the labor force), see for instance, Bernasco 
(1994), Blossfeld, Drobnic and Rohwer (1995); 
3. there may be parallel processes at the intermediate level (e.g. one can analyze 
how changing household structure determines women's intentional participation 
in the work force), see as an example, Blossfeld and Hakim (forthcoming); 
4. there may be parallel processes at the macro level (e.g. one may be interested 
in the effect of changes in the business cycle on individuals choices with regard 
to family formation), see Blossfeld and Huinink (1991); 
5. there may be any combination of processes type (1) to (4). For example, in the 
study of life-course, cohort and period effects, time-dependent covariates at 
different levels must be included simultaneously (Blossfeld 1986; Mayer and 
Huinink 1990). Such an analysis combines processes at the individual level 
(Iife-course change) with two kinds of processes at the macro level: (1) variations 
in structural conditions across successive (birth, marriage, etc.) cohorts, and (2) 
changes in particular historical conditions affecting all cohorts in the same way. 
In event history analysis, time-dependent covariates have been used to include the 
sam pie path of parallel processes in transition rate models. In the literature however 
in time (Manski 1995). 
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only two types of time-dependent covariates have been described as not being subject 
to reverse causation (see e.g. Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; Tuma and Hannan 1984; 
Blossfeld, Hamerle, and Mayer 1989; Vamaguchi 1991; Courgeau and Lelievre 1992): 
1. Defined time-dependent covariates whose total time path (or functional from of 
change over time) is determined in advance in the same way for all subjects under 
study. For example, process time like age or duration in astate (e.g. duration of 
marriage in divorce studies), is a defined time-dependent covariate because its values 
are predetermined for all the subjects. Thus, by definition, the values of these 
time-dependent covariates cannot be affected by the dependent process under study. 
2. Ancillary time-dependent covariates whose time path is the output of a stochastic 
process that is external to the units under study.80 Again, by definition, the values of 
these time-dependent covariates cannot be influenced by the individual actor 
themselves. Examples of time-dependent covariates that are approximately external 
in the analysis of individual life courses are variables that reflect changes at the macro 
level of society (unemployment rates, occupational structure, etc.) or the population 
level (composition of the population in terms of age, sex, race, etc.), provided that the 
contribution of each actor is small and does not really affect the structure in the 
population (Vamaguchi 1991 ).81 
In contrast to defined or ancillary time-dependent covariates, internal time-dependent 
covariates have been referred to as being problematic for causal analysis of social 
processes (e.g. Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; Tuma and Hannan 1984; Blossfeld, 
Hamerle, and Mayer 1989; Vamaguchi 1991; Courgeau and Lelievre 1992). An internal 
time-dependent covariate VtB describes a stochastic process, considered in a causal 
model as being the cause, that is in turn affected by another stochastic process VtA, 
considered in the causal model as being the effect. Thus, there are direct effects in 
which the processes autonomously affect each other (VtB affects vt and vt affects 
Vt
B) , and there are "feedback" effects, in which these processes are affected by 
themselves via the respective other process (VtB affects VtB via vt and vt affects vt 
via Vt
B). In other words, such processes are interdependent and form what has been 
called a dynamic system (Tuma and Hannan 1984). Interdependence is typical at the 
individual level for processes in different domains of life and at the level of few 
individuals interacting with each other (e.g. strategic or game-theoretic actions in the 
case of career trajectories of partners; see, e.g., Elster 1979). For example, the 
empirical literature suggests that the employment trajectory of an individual is 
influenced by his/her marital history and marital history is dependent on the 
employment trajectory. 
80 In Eister's (1979) terminology, this is parametric rationality or parametric action. 
81 For example, consider the changes in the occupational structure. While a job move 
by an individual might contribute to the change in the occupational structure, its 
effect on the job structure is negligibly small. 
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Blossfeld and Rohwer (1995) have proposed a causal approach to interdependent 
systems that provides a straightforward solution to (1) the simultaneity problem of 
interdependent processes, (2) the identification of lags between causes and their 
effects, (3) the study of temporal shapes of effects, and (4) the dynamic integration of 
macro and micro perspectives. I will outline this approach in more detail in the 
following. 
Causes and Time-Dependent Covariates 
In an influential paper, Holland (1986) developed the idea that causal statements imply 
counterfactual reasoning: 11 the cause had been different, there would have been 
another outcome, at least with a certain probability. However, the consequences of 
conditions that could be different from their actual state are obviously not empirically 
observable.82 This means that it is simply impossible to observe the effect that would 
have happened on the same unit of analysis, if it were exposed to another condition 
at the same time. 
Because causal relationships are inherently time-related connections, Blossfeld and 
Rohwer (1995) suggested to look in empirical applications at conditions which actually 
do change in time.83 For example, a time-constant variable ugender" should ideally 
be replaced in an empirical analysis by time-changing events assumed to produce 
sex-specific differences in the life history of men and women. Of course, in empirical 
research that is not always possible, so that very often one must rely on time-constant 
"variables" as weil. However, it is important to recognize that for these variables the 
implied longitudinal causal relation is not examined. For example, if we observe an 
association among people with different levels of educational attainment and their job 
opportunities, then we can normally draw the conclusion that changes in job 
opportunities are a result of changes in educational attainment level. The implied idea 
is the following: If we started having people with the lowest educational attainment 
level and followed them over the life course, they would presumably differ in their rates 
to attaining higher levels of educational attainment and this would produce changes 
in job opportunities. Whether this would be the case for each individual is not very 
clear from a study based on people with different levels of educational attainment. In 
particular, one would expect that the causal relationship (or causal mechanism) 
between education and job opportunities would radically be altered if all people 
acquired a higher (or the highest) level of educational attainment. Thus, the two 
statements - the first about associations across different members of a population and 
the second about dependencies in the life course for each individual member of the 
population - are quite different; one type of statement can be empirically true while the 
other can be empirically false. Therefore, statements of the first type cannot be 
regarded as substitutes for statements of the second type. However, since all causal 
propositions have consequences for longitudinal change (see Lieberson 1985), only 
82 Holland (1986) calls this IIthe fundamental problem of causal inference. 1I 
83 These changes can occur in discrete and continuous types of processes. 
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time-changing variables provide a more convincing empirical evidence of causal 
relations. 
These changes are events. More formally, an event is a change in a qualitative or 
quantitative variable, and this change must happen at a specific point in time. The 
most obvious empirical representation of causes is therefore in terms of variables that 
can change their states over time. In event history analysis, this statement is linked 
very naturally with the concept of time-dependent covariates. The role of a time-de-
pendent covariate in this approach is to indicate that a (qualitative or metric, direct or 
indirect observable) causal factor has changed its state at a specific time and that the 
unit under study is exposed to another causal condition. 
Form this point of view, it seems somewhat misleading to regard processes or states 
of processes as causes. Instead, only events, or changes in astate variable, can 
sensibly be viewed as possible causes. 
Time and Causal Effects 
Consequently, we would not say that a process vt is a cause of a process VtB, but 
that a change in vt could be a cause (or provide a new condition) of a change in VtB. 
Or more formally: 
~ vt ~ ~ Vt'B t < t' 
meaning that a change in process vt at time t is a cause of a change in variable Vt'B 
at a later point in time, t'. It is not implied, of course, that vt is the only cause which 
might affect Vt,B. So we should speak of causal conditions to stress that there might 
be, and normally is, a quite complex set of causes. A change in variable vt is 
therefore always measured relative to other causes. As noted by Marini and Singer 
(1988), a conjunctive plurality of causes occurs if various factors must be jointly 
present to produce an effect. A disjunctive plurality of causes, on the other hand, 
occu rs if the effect is produced by each of several factors alone, and the joint 
occurrence of two or more factors does not alter the effect.84 These considerations 
are important because in my view they provide the main reason for a time-dependence 
of causal mechanisms in sociology. They are always relative to a history-specific 
constellation of other causes. A causal mechanism may change or even disappear in 
the course of history because of changes in the setting of other important causes. 
Thus, if causal mechanisms are studied empirically, they must intrinsically be related 
to historical time. There are several further important aspects. 
84 See the extensive discussion by Marini and Singer (1988). 
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Time Axis and Events 
First, to speak of a change in variables necessarily implies reference to a time axis. 
We need at least two points in time to observe that a variable has changed its value. 
Of course, at least approximately, we can say that a variable has changed its value 
at a specific point in time.85 Therefore, we use symbols to refer to changes in the 
values of the time-dependent variable Ll vt and the state variable Ll VtB at time t. This 
leads to the important point that causal statements relate changes in two (or more) 
variables. 
Time Order, Time Intervals, and Apparent Simultaneity 
Second, there is a time ordering between causes and effects. The cause must 
precede the effect in time: t < t', in the formal representation given above. This seems 
to be generally accepted.86 As an implication, there must be a temporal interval 
between the change in the variable representing a cause, and the change in the 
variable representing a corresponding effect. Thus, the role of time in causal explana-
tions does not only lie in specifying a temporal order in which the effect follows the 
cause in time. It additionally implies that a temporal interval is necessary for the cause 
to have an impact (Kelly and McGrath 1988). It takes some finite amount of time for 
the cause to produce the effect. The time interval may be very short or very long, but 
can never be zero or infinity (Kelly and McGrath 1988). In other words, there can 
never be a simultaneity of cause and its effect. 
Some effects take place almost instantaneously. For example, if the effect occurs at 
microsecond intervals, then the process must be observed in these small time units 
to uncover causal relations. However, some effects may occur in a time interval too 
small to be measured by any given methods, so that cause and effect seem to occur 
at the same point in time. Apparent simultaneity is often the case in those social 
science applications where basic observation intervals are relatively crude (e.g. days, 
months, or even years), such as, for example, yearly data about first marriage and first 
childbirth (Blossfeld, Manting, and Rohwer 1993). Other effects need a long time until 
they start to occur. Thus, there is a delay or lag between cause and effect that must 
be specified in an appropriate causal analysis. Unfortunately, in most of the current 
85 Statements like this implicitly refer to some specification of "point in time." The 
meaning normally depends on the kind of events which are to be described, for in-
stance, a marriage, the birth of a child, or becoming unemployed. In event history 
text books, a continuous time axis for purposes of mathematical modeling is 
nonnally assumed (see Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). This should however be 
understood as an idealized way of representing social time. Here we are using 
mathematical concepts to speak about social reality, so we will disregard the 
dispute about whether time is "continuous" (in the mathematical sense of this word), 
or not (see also Abbott 1992). 
86 See, for instance, the discussion in Eells (1991, Ch.,5). 
32 
rational choice theories and interpretations of research findings this interval is left 
unspecified. 
Temporal Shapes of the Unfolding Effect 
This immediately leads to a third point. There might be different shapes of how the 
causal effect Vt unfolds over time. While the problem of time-Iags is somehow 
recognized in the literature on methods in sociology, almost no attention has been 
given to the temporal shapes of effects (Kelly and McGrath 1988). Sociologists often 
seem to be quite ignorant about the fact that causal effects could be highly 
time-dependent, too. They normally assume that there is an almost all-at-once change 
in the dependent variable that is then maintained. However, the effect may be very 
time-dependent too. For example, (1) it may gradually increase; (2) at first rise, reach 
a maximum and then decrease; or (3) show a cyclical pattern over time (see Blossfeld 
and Rohwer 1995). Thus, an appropriate understanding of causal relations between 
variables should take into account that the causal relationship itself may change over 
time. This seems particularly important in sociological applications of causal reasoning. 
In these applications we generally cannot rely on the assumption of eternal, time-Iess 
laws but have to recognize that the causal mechanisms may change during the 
development of social processes. In fact, analyses of these changes of mechanisms 
is usually what is of particular interest in sociology. 
The Principle of Conditional Independence 
Combining these ideas, a causal view on parallel and interdependent processes 
becomes easy, at least in principle. Given two parallel processes, vt and VtB, a 
change in vt at any (specific) point in time f may depend on the history of both 
processes up to, but not including f. Or stated in another way: what happens with vt 
at any point in time f is conditionally independent of what happens with VtB at f, 
conditional on the history of the joint process Vt = (vt,vtB) up to, but not including f. 
Of course, the same reasoning can be applied if one focuses on vt instead of VtB as 
the lIdependent variable. 11 Blossfeld and Rohwer (1995) call this the principle of 
conditional independence for parallel and interdependent processes.87 
The same idea can be developed more formally in the event history framework. 
Beginning with a transition rate model for the joint process, Vt = (vt,vtB), and 
assuming the principle of conditional independence, the likelihood for this model can 
be factorized into a product of the likelihoods for two separate models: a transition rate 
model for Vt A which is dependent on VtB as a time-dependent covariate, and a . . 
87 The terminology is adapted from Gardner and Griffin (1986), and Pötter (1993). 
33 
transition rate model for ytB which is dependent on ytA as a time-dependent 
covariate.88 Estimating the effects of time-dependent (qualitative and metric) 
processes on the transition rate (or action process) can then easily be achieved by 
applying the method of episode splitting (see Blossfeld, Hamerle, and Mayer 1989; 
Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). 
Actors, Probabilistic Causal Relations and the Hazard Rate 
If sociological phenomena are always directly or indirectly based on actions of 
individuals, then sociology cannot on!y deal \AJith associations among variables (e.g. 
pregnancy/birth and marriage) per se, but with variables that are associated via acting 
people. There are at least three consequences for the empirical analysis of causal 
relations in the social sciences: 
First, if individuals relate causes and effects through their actions, then explanation of 
social processes should be related to individuals (principle of methodological 
individualism). This is why life history data on individuals, and not aggregated 
longitudinal data, provide the most appropriate empirical evidence for hypotheses 
about social change. It is only with these data that one can trace the courses of action 
at the level of each individual over time. 
Second, as discussed in detail above, the explaining or understanding of social 
processes requires (see Elster 1979): (1) a time-related specification of structural con-
straints which cut down the set of abstractly possible courses of action to a vastly 
sm aller subset of feasible actions89 ; and (2) mechanisms that single out which of the 
feasible courses of action shall be realized. Because this is done by individuals, these 
mechanisms must rest on the tastes, beliefs, expectations and constraints of the 
agents. In particular, it must be based on rational- expectations. "The term rational-
expectations .... should not be confused with the unrelated concept of rational choice. 
A person giving a rational-expectations response to an intentions question would begin 
by recognizing that future behavior will depend in part on conditions known at the 
survey and in part on events that have not yet occurred" (Manski 1995; 102-103). 
88 The mathematical steps leading to this factorization are, in principle, very easy but 
unfortunately need a complex terminology. The mathematical apparatus will 
therefore not be given here. The mathematics can be found in Blossfeld and 
Rohwer (1995), Gardner and Griffin (1986), Pötter (1993), and Rohwer (1995). An 
important implication is that since not only the states, but also functions of time (e.g. 
duration) can be inc!uded conditionally, the distinction between state and rate 
dependence proposed by Tuma and Hannan (1984) loses its meaning (see also 
Pötter 1993). 
89 Here, we must be careful because by taking constraints as given we tend to ignore 
the case that individuals sometimes do not choose among the given alternatives, 
but try to either open more for themselves or close some to other people (see 
Gambetta 1987). 
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However, the future evolutions of these conditions cannot be predicted by the 
respondent with certainty. Thus, if we really want to test propositions derived from 
rational choice models, we have to gather additional time-related data on these 
unobservable entities. Since it is weil known that retrospective questions concerning 
motivational, attitudinal, cognitive or affective states are particularly problematic, the 
collection of panel observations of these states, combined with retrospective 
information on behavioral events since the last panel wave, seems to be an 
appropriate and feasible data collection design.90 
Against such causal analytical studies, it is sometimes argued that since human actors 
act intentionally and behavior is goal-oriented, the intentions or motives of actors to 
bring about some effect in the future causes the actor to behave in a specific way in 
the present (Marini and Singer 1988). This does not however contradict our causal 
view. One simply has to distinguish intentions, motives or plans as they occur in the 
present from their impact on the behavior which follows their formation temporally, and 
from the final result, as an outcome of the behavior. An expectation about a future 
state of affairs should clearly be distinguished from what eventually happens in the 
future. Therefore, the fact that social agents can behave intentionally, based on 
expectations, does not reverse the time order underlying our causal statements. 
Third, if it is individuals that are doing the acting, then causal inference must also take 
into account the free will of individuals.91 This introduces an essential element of 
indeterminacy into causal inferences. Hence, in sociology we can only reasonably 
account for and model the generality but not the determinacy of behavior. The aim of 
substantive (and statistical) models must therefore be to capture common elements 
in the behavior of people, or patterns of action that recur in many cases (Weber 1972; 
Goldthorpe in this volume). Theoretical models in sociology must not seek to explain 
the behavior of single individuals, but the behavior of aggregate entities such as 
groups. In other words, in social science applications, randomness has to enter as a 
defining characteristic of causal models. We can only hope to make sensible causal 
statements about how a given or (hypothesized) change in variable vt (e.g. 
90 In the past, social psychologists in particular have expected too much correspon-
den ce between stated intentions and subsequent behavior. They have written that 
intentions and behavior should coincide. For example, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980:50) 
write, "we are claiming that intentions should always predict behavior". Demogra-
phers, on the other hand, have contended that individual-level divergences between 
intentions and behavior should average out in the aggregate. However, in reality, 
both premises are flawed. Intentions and behavior may diverge substantially, both 
at the individual level and in the aggregate, whenever behavior depends on events 
not yet realized at the time of the survey. This is the case even if intentions data 
provide the best predictions of behavior that can be made, given the information 
available when the survey is performed (Manski 1995: 109). 
91 By "free will" of individuals, I mean they are free agents with wills of their own. They 
are not pre-determined by processes which they do not control, but they can act 
according to any idea. 
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pregnancy/birth) in the past affects the probability of a change in variable Vt'B (e.g. 
marriage) in the future. Correspondingly, the basic causal relation becomes 
In the social sciences, this interpretation seems more appropriate than the traditional 
deterministic approach. The essential difference is not that our knowledge about 
causes is insufficient, allowing only probabilistic statements (see Lieberson 1991), but 
that the causal effect to be explained can only be a probability. Thus, probability in this 
context is not just a technical term anymore, but must be considered a theoretical one: 
it is the propensity of social agents to change their behavior intentionally. 
Using event history data and hazard rate models, the causal reasoning underlying our 
approach can therefore be restated in a somewhat more precise form as 
L\. vt ~ Ar(t') t < t' 
As a causal effect, the changes in covariates vt in the past may lead to changes in 
the transition rate r(t') in the future, which in turn describes the propensity that the 
actors under study will change their course of action. This causal interpretation 
requires that we take the temporal order in which the structural constraints evolve and 
the actors with their time-related beliefs and motivations seriously. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
During the last 15 years, there has been an explosion of rational choice scholarship 
in the social sciences. The purpose of this paper has been to discuss some of the 
reasons why this development has had surprisingly little influence on large-scale data 
analysis. My thesis is that in the process of establishing rational choice theory as the 
only coherent and unified sociological approach, its proponents have pigeonholed their 
rivals, caricatured competing theories, exaggerated existing theoretical cleavages, 
overlooked their own conceptional weaknesses, downplayed the difficulties of their 
empirical applications, and neglected more recent and actually quite successful 
theoretically driven research programs based on longitudinal data. 
Because rational choice theory is fairly established in sociology tOday, the chances are 
quite good that the current unproductive dualism between macro-Ievel and micro-Ievel 
approaches could be overcome. Theoretically powerful sociological analyses must pay 
attention to both structural- and micro-Ievel issues. However, not in the usual static 
way. Any macro-micro framework must recognize that time matters in this relationship. 
It must identify the particular historical structures and processes which dominate the 
changes occurring in a given population and it has to specify the causal mechanisms 
that allow us to trace the encounters of intentionally acting individuals with the flow of 
history as aseries of choice processes. An important advancement in this respect has 
been that longitudinal data can be studied by new statistical methods in a stepwise 
time-related fashion. Event history analysis provides effective tools to test causal 
propositions derived from adynamie combination of micro- and macro-Ievel 
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considerations. What is still largely missing are more systematic time-related data 
collection efforts based on rational choice conceptions, covering data not only on 
behavior but also on tastes, beliefs, expectations as weil as decisions. This type of 
sociological research is not easy to conduct and is still at its rudimentary beginnings. 
But only such studies will allow us to achieve a more rigorous empirical analysis of 
rational choice propositions and enable us to find out whether rational choice thinking 
really means progress in applied research. 
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